Loyola of Los Angeles International
and Comparative Law Review
Volume 32
Number 2 Spring 2010

Article 1

3-22-2010

An Oasis in the Desert: The Emergency of Israeli investment
Treaties in the Global Economy
Efraim Chalamish

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Efraim Chalamish, An Oasis in the Desert: The Emergency of Israeli investment Treaties in the Global
Economy, 32 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 123 (2010).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/vol32/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

An Oasis in the Desert: The Emergence
of Israeli Investment Treaties in the
Global Economy
EFRAIM CHALAMISH*

I. INTRODUCrION

Recent changes in the global economy have forced countries
to compete on foreign direct investment (FDI) more forcefully in
order to increase their respective growth and development.
Capital-exporting countries have simultaneously become more
concerned with the economic and physical protection of their
citizens' investments abroad, while diversifying their investments
worldwide. Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) have been used
by governments to encourage mutual flows of foreign investments
between the contracting parties and to protect these investments.
Since 1959, when the first BIT was introduced to the international
economic community, the BITs' network has expanded
dramatically and today consists of more than 2,500 treaties
worldwide.
Most BITs include a bilateral commitment of both
governments to encourage foreign investments in their countries
and protect such investments. According to such treaties, investors
enjoy national treatment and most-favored-nation protection
standards. Additionally, BITs offer investors an enforceable
dispute settlement mechanism that allows them to initiate an
investor-state procedure in order to recover their investments.
Traditionally, BITs did not include any development aspects,
* S.J.D., L.L.M. (University of Michigan), LL.B., LL.M., M.B.A. (Bar Ilan University). I
would like to thank the government officials who made this research possible, including
Mayor Admon, Yoel Berris, Danny Catarivas, Hadassah Greenberg, and Zvia Gross. I am
grateful to Reuven Avi-Yonah, Robert Howse, and Marina Whitman for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. All errors are my own.
1. Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto
MultilateralAgreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT'LL. 303, 315-16 (2009).
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although several initiatives led mainly by the non-governmental
organization (NGO) community have called for such inclusion.
Although these treaties share similar structure, investors'
rights, and obligations, they can serve as a substitute for
multilateral investment agreements, and they have frequently
reflected the need to balance the encouragement of FDI with the
protection of national interests and local businesses. Developed
and developing countries have reached a consensus regarding the
need to protect foreign investments and the acceptable level of
protection. However, the process of treaty negotiation and
drafting provides the parties with an opportunity to adjust
customary and treaty law based on the specific needs and interests
of the contracting parties.
Israel became a developed economy and emerged as a capital
exporter in a relatively short period of time, and serves as a
fascinating precedent for other developing economies. These
emerging economies face similar changes and struggles, balancing
the need to protect national interests with encouragement and
protection of foreign investments. In addition, while extensive
writing has discussed Israel's innovative trade policy and its
groundbreaking integration into the European and. other global
markets, there has been no recent academic writing about its
corresponding investment policy, which has been recently
reshaped by the adoption of a new model investment treaty. In
light of past, present, and possible future practices, this calls for an
updated and comprehensive analysis of Israel's FDI and BIT
policy.
This article will analyze the evolution of Israeli investment
treaties. The first part will discuss the investment policy in Israel,
in the context of Israel's transition from a capital-importing
economy to capital-exporting economy. This article suggests that
Israel's transition has played a major role in developing investment
treaties in Israel. Next, this article will examine the background
and development of the 2004 Israel New Model Bilateral
Investment Treaty, which serves as the basic framework for all
future BITs that are negotiated by the Israeli government. Finally,
this article will present an overview of the existing investment
2. Id. at 323.
3. Id. at 344-45.
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treaties in Israel and the key provisions of the 2004 Israel New
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty. The provisions will be
discussed in light of the evolving - investment arbitration
jurisprudence, comparing the Israeli model and existing Israeli
investment treaties with other investment treaty models.
The multilateralism aspect of the investment treaty network,
which has been referred to by some scholars as the "common law"
of investment arbitration, impacts the way investment arbitral
tribunals interpret common investment treaty provisions using
arbitration precedents.! Therefore, a close examination of the
rights and obligations of states and investors in the Israeli model
will help us better understand the level of implementation and
deviation from investment law jurisprudence in Israeli investment
treaties.
This analysis will be based on a series of interviews conducted
with Israeli government officials between 2004 and 2007 and
official investment treaty documentation. The 2004 U.S. Model
BIT,6 among several other models, will serve as a major point of
reference in our analysis. The 2004 U.S. Model BIT will serve as
our primary reference because it implements a significant part of
the developing investment arbitration jurisprudence and
represents a new model of investment agreement in a free trade
agreement. Moreover, the 2004 U.S. Model BIT calls for a better
balance between the national. interests of countries or host states
that receive foreign investments and the protection of foreign
investors by including additional provisions on environment and
labor rights, to name a few, in the investment treaty. This article
4. See, e.g., CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL.,

INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT

ARBITRATION: SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 18-21 (2007).
5. Id.
6. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment,
availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf.
7. The first treaty to apply the U.S. 2004 Model BIT was the U.S.-Uruguay BIT,
which was signed on November 4, 2005 and entered into force on November 1, 2006. The
U.S.-Uruguay BIT is the first BIT the United States has concluded since 1999.
8. For example, the International Institute for Sustainable Development in its IISD
Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development [hereinafter
IISD Model] called for adoption of such provisions. See HOWARD MANN ET AL., INT'L
INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., IISD MODEL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON
INVESTMENT

FOR

SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT

12-13

http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment-model-int-agreement.pdf
MODEL AGREEMENT].

(2005), - available

[hereinafter

at

IISD
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will further examine how Israel should deal with the evolving
trends in international investment law moving forward.
II. ISRAEL AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT
In order to fully understand Israel's investment policy and its
BIT program, a careful ' review of the characteristics of its
economy, along with its recent structural changes, is required.
"In the past several years, the Israeli economy has been
undergoing a comprehensive pro-market, pro-competition
structural reform program: reducing government expenditures,
cutting taxes, . . . [reforming legal frameworks in areas that

affect business operation conditions,] breaking up monopolies,
privatizing state-owned companies and banks, promoting
competition, reforming the pension system, [and] reforming the
capital market."'
This reform has gradually but dramatically reduced the
political and economic risk of foreign investment in Israel.'o As a
result, the Israeli government's need to sign BITs in order to
protect and increase foreign investment has diminished
significantly. Indeed, the total inflows of foreign investments in
2006 increased three fold over the total inflows in 2005, indicating
sustainable long-term investments. The increase in total inflows
of foreign investment was boosted by direct investments in the
rapidly expanding high-tech sector in Israel, and portfolio
investments in Israel's capital markets, primarily through the Tel
Aviv Stock Exchange, which have been "free from almost all
exchange controls.since 1998."" The total number of FDI inflows

9. ISRAEL: Ready for the OECD 13, International Department, Ministry of
Finance, the Government of Israel (March 2006).
10. See id. ("IMF staff statement at the conclusion of a visit to Israel, on December
12, 2005, said Israel's 'commitment to increased competition and efficiency has enhanced
market confidence and is crucial in fostering sustainable growth."') (emphasis removed).
11. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Foreign
Direct
Investment
.
Database,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/
Page.asp?intitemlD=3198&lang=1 [hereinafter UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment
Database].
12. MARC LUBAN, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FINANCE, ISRAEL: READY FOR THE
OECD
(2007),
http://cooperazione.formez.it/sections/documenti/israel-ready-forthe/downloadFile/attachedFile_fO/israel-oecd.pdf?nocache=1179891521.92.
13. Id. at 20.
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continued to be high in 2007 and 2008, even in times of financial
crisis and global economic slowdown.14
Although mainly associated with the import of capital, Israel
has also faced a significant recent expansion towards Israeli
investments abroad.' The total FDI outflows in 2006 were 14.9
inflows were 14.8 billion
billion U.S. dollars, while the total FDI
16
U.S. dollars during the same period. Thus, Israel became an
important player in several foreign markets, some of which are
developing countries. In turn, these foreign markets called for the
protection of foreign investments coming out of Israel. This article
will explore the main factors behind Israel's transition from being
a capital-importing country to a capital-exporting one in order to
better understand the nature of investment treaties between Israel
and other countries, and how the current structure of Israeli
investment treaties reflects and advances this transition.
A. Regional and GeopoliticalDevelopments
The Israeli economy is tied to Middle Eastern trends and,
since the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, has been
substantially influenced by the political and security circumstances
in the region. New diplomatic relations that were crafted during
the Oslo Agreements in the mid 1990s initially brought forth new
investment opportunities for Israeli investors in Jordan and other
areas of the world. In recent years, certain developments in the
peace process between Israel and several Arab countries have
opened the door for Israeli investments in countries that
traditionally had limited or completely lacked diplomatic and
economic relations with Israel. For example, geopolitical changes
in the Middle East and the negotiations between Israel and the
Palestinian Authority allowed Israelis to invest indirectly in Iraq.
14. See

ISRAEL MINISTRY

OF FINANCE,

INT'L AFFAIRS DEP'T, ECONOMIC

HIGHLIGHTS at 5-6 (2008), http://www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il/Financelsrael/Docs/
En/EconomicHighlights/EconomicHighlights-2008-2.pdf.
15. See SANBAR ET AL., ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY IN ISRAEL (1989); Press
Release, Bank of Israel, Nonresident Investment in Israel and Resident Investment

Abroad, July 2009 (Aug. 9, 2009), available at http://www.bankisrael.gov.il/press/eng
/090908/090908r.htm.
16. See UNCTAD Foreign Direct Investment Database, supra note 11.
17. The estimated Israeli export potential in Iraq is US$250 million per annum. See
lason Athanasiadis, Israeli Firms in Post-Ba'athistBaghdad, ASIA TIMES, Oct. 21, 2003,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/MiddleEast/EJ2lAk05.html for a further discussion on the
ways Israelis can conduct business in Iraq without the impact of the anti-Israel movement.
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The collapse of the Soviet Union, the rapid economic growth of
Eastern European countries, to which many Israeli citizens have
strong ties, and the enlargement of the, European Union created
new investment opportunities for Israel and increased the Israeli
direct investment outflows in these regions.
In addition to these political factors, several countries
encouraged foreign investment from Israel as a strategy for
achieving normalization, including reciprocal diplomatic and
economic relations. In many cases, Israeli investments in foreign
attempt to normalize
countries are a reflection of a mutual
18
diplomatic and economic relations. This is especially true when it
comes to developing and least developing countries, which tend to
seek the benefits of advanced industries, such as the know-how of
Israel's high-tech industry.
B. InternalStructural Changes
Besides diplomatic and economic changes, the Israeli
economy has gone through some internal structural changes in an
attempt to keep up with developments in the global economy. The
Israeli market has tried to enhance efficiency by focusing on
industries where it has a competitive advantage, for example,
Research and Development ("R&D") industries. Many other
industries that operate less efficiently in Israel have prompted
various levels of outsourcing, further enhancing Israeli investments
abroad.' 9
C. IsraeliMultinationals
Another interrelated economic phenomenon is the recent
development of Israeli multinational corporations. While in the
past most Israeli companies were managed and operated in Israel,
today it has become common practice for Israeli companies to be

For example, Israeli business professionals can sell supplies to Jordan, where the products
are repackaged and sold to Iraq without Israeli labeling.
18. Interview with Mayor Admon, Ministry of Fin., Gov't of Isr., in Jerusalem, Isr.
(Nov. 7, 2007) (explaining this phenomenon in detail) [hereinafter ADMON
INTERVIEW I].
19. Accordingly, while Israel serves as an IT outsourcing center for many
multinational corporations, it prefers to outsource low-tech industries. See generally ATUL
VASHISTHA & AVINASH VASHISTHA, THE OFFSHORE NATION: STRATEGIES FOR
SUCCESS IN GLOBAL OUTSOURCING AND OFFSHORING (2006).
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multinational by nature, especially in a high-tech industry.20 The
new global presence was accompanied by raising capital in foreign
capital markets, primarily in the United States. A recent crossborder study of Israeli multinationals shows that as of July 2008
the top 15 Israeli multinationals have 7.5 billion U.S. dollars in
foreign assets, over 21 billion U.S. dollars in foreign sales,
including exports, and employ nearly 63,000 persons abroad,
making Israel one of the top 20 countries in terms of outward FDI
flows. These figures indicate that new Israeli multinationals have
transferred a significant portion of their investments to foreign
markets. Throughout the years, the Israeli government played a
crucial role in this transformation by signing Free Trade
Agreements. These agreements reduced commodities and service
marketing efficiency, thus
costs and increased production and
23
fostering multinational operations.
D. Foreign Currency Liberalization
As the trends of globalization and internal economic changes
in the Israeli market have opened up the foreign currency market
for competition, a similar process has occurred in foreign currency
liberalization. For example, one important change in the new
currency regime is the ability of Israeli companies to invest in
subsidiaries abroad. Such investments have become a significant
portion of Israeli investments in foreign markets. Furthermore, tax
planning, an integral part of the evolving international tax regime,

20. See Nisso Cohen, The Israel High-Tech Industry - Fifty Years of Excellence,
SPOTLIGHT ON ISRAEL (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Oct. 20, 2002, available at
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/facts%20about%20israel/science%20%20technology/the%20israel%20high-tech%20industry%20%20fifty%20years%20of%20exc.
21. Id.
22. Press Release, Vale Columbia Ctr. on Sustainable Int'l Inv., Israeli Multinationals
Rise in Foreign Markets: Release of the First Ranking of Israeli Multinational Enterprises
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/projects/documents/
2008),
9,
(July
IsraelPressReleaseJune-28_inal.pdf.
23. Among these Free Trade Agreements are agreements with the EU, United
States, Mexico, Canada, Bulgaria, Turkey, Romania, Jordan, Egypt, and EFTA (Iceland,
Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland). See Mandatory Tenders Regulations
(Preference for Israel Products and Mandatory Business Cooperation), 1995, KT 5755,
562, § 3(a) (Isr.).
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allows Israeli companies to invest in 24low-taxed subsidiaries in
order to reduce their total tax exposure.
E. Summary: From Import to Export of Capital
All of these trends have gradually accumulated to position the
Israeli economy as a capital exporter economy, increasing the level
of direct investment outflow abroad and opening many new
markets for. Israeli investors. New circumstances required the
Israeli administration to reshape its FDI policy and international
economic agreements in a way that supports Israel's new economic
interests, for example, by advancing local inflows while protecting
increasing outflows abroad. As expressed by the Saluka arbitral
tribunal and other tribunals and critics, the eventual economic goal
behind investment treaties is25 the encouragement of foreign
investment in the host state. This type of. investment is an
essential engine for economic growth. However, the treaties' text
and investment arbitration cases have historically focused on the
protection of foreign investment in unstable economies through an
objective and de-politicized dispute resolution mechanism; The
desire to provide safer investments in Israel, and the change in the
balance of import-export of capital, call into question the role of
such protective investment treaties in international economic
agreements and the preferred model in Israel. In an attempt to
answer this question and understand the reaction to the new global
and local developments in investment law, the following section
discusses the factors involved in the Israeli government's policy
towards negotiation and signing investment treaties.

III.

ISRAELI BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES- POLICY AND
STRATEGY

The Israeli government's policy regarding BITs involves
numerous factors including the long-term strategy to integrate the
Israeli economy into the global economy, budget constraints, and

24. The European Court of Justice confirmed the legality of such structure in the
European Community on September 12, 2006. See generally Case C-196/04, Cadbury
Schweppes plc v. Comm'rs of Inland Revenue, 2006 E.C.R. 1-7995.
25. Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, 1 300 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/SALat
available
2006),
CZ%20Partial%C20Award%20170306.pdf.
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political preferences.2 Many of these factors seem conflicting, but
a careful review of the Israeli government's strategy and treatymaking process raises the question of whether a coherent policy
does indeed exist. Similar to other governmental functions,
shaping this policy and negotiating the treaties involves multiple
agencies with colliding interests, changing administrations, and
other internal structural constraints. Nevertheless, in the absence
of interpretation notes to the BITs and the Israeli model draft
treaty,27 this section will examine the policy as it emerged from
governmental documents and in-depth interviews with the
appropriate government officials.
A. Investment Protection
The Israeli government distinguishes between its policies
towards developed and developing countries. This difference
reflects how Israel is in transition from being a developing country
to a developed one.28 The interesting correlation between the selfdefinition of the economy and its BITs policy may shed light on
why countries sign BITs and what they try to achieve through this
process.
First, Israel traditionally tends to avoid negotiating BITs with
other developed countries, as part of the view that developed
countries should not sign BITs among themselves. The reason for
this is, at least in theory, clear. Developed countries with
democratic institutions, liberal economy, and strong enforcement
of commercial practices simply lack the fundamental need to sign
26. Oded Boneh, Bilateral Investment Treaties at the IsraeliContext, 26 ha-Riv' on haYibre' eli le-misim [The Israeli Tax Review] 45, 56 (1977) (Isr.). Mr. Boneh served as the
head of the Bilateral Investment Treaties group, International Department, Israeli
Ministry of Finance, till 2004. Several parts of this section are based on interviews
conducted with Mr. Boneh in April 2004 in Tel Aviv, Israel.
27. These interpretation notes could have been a reliable source of information
regarding investment treaties. policy. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, art. 31, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/117601.pdf [hereinafter U.S. 2004 Model BIT].
28. Mr. Mayor Admon, Deputy Director of International Department, Ministry of
Finance, the Government of Israel, perceives this transition as the leading vehicle for the
development of the BITs policy in recent years in Israel. Accord Interview with Mayor
Admon, Deputy Dir. of Int'l Dep't, Ministry of Fin., Gov't of Isr., in Jerusalem, Isr. (Apr.
2004); Interview with Mayor Admon, Deputy Dir. of Int'l Dep't, Ministry of Fin., Gov't of
Isr., in Jerusalem, Isr. (Dec. 2004); Interview with Mayor Admon, Deputy Dir. of Int'l
Dep't, Ministry of Fin., Gov't of Isr., in Jerusalem, Isr. (Mar. 2006).
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BITs in order to protect investors from expropriation or regulation
that affects their investments. Since Israel views itself as a
developed country with a stable economy, it has made it a general
rule not to sign or negotiate BITs with other developed countries,
with the exceptions of France and Germany.
Negotiating and signing such agreements with other
developed countries could send a bad signal to international
markets and hurt Israel's status, credit ratings by international
agencies, or potential for future investments.30 Moreover, Israel is
consistently trying to develop and maintain its image as a
developed and stable country, both politically and financially. For
example, the Ariav Committee of the Ministry of Finance has
recentl examined ways to transform Israel into a global financial
center. Any attempt to protect foreign investments in Israel
through BITs undermines such a strategy. Consequently, Israel
finds it unnecessary to push for such agreements with countries
where Israeli investors already enjoy a stable political and
economic atmosphere, along with a reliable justice system.33
According to this argument, Israeli BITs with Western and other
29. Treaty Between the State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Isr.-F.R.G.,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/usercontrols/
available
at
24,
1976,
June
TreatFile.aspx?SAFA=2&AMANA=774 [hereinafter Israel-Germany BIT] (entered into
force temporarily on August 28, 1980). This agreement reflects a period of time when
Israel was still considered a developing market among major European markets; Entre le
Gouvernement de la Republique Frangaise et le Gouvernment de l'Etat d'Israel sur
I'encouragement et la protection reciproques des investissements [Treaty between the
Government of the Republic of France and the Government of the State of Israel
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments], June 9, 1983,
Fr.-Isr., J.O., Feb. 17, 1985, p. 2087, available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/
dite/iialdocs/bits/franceisrael fr.pdf.
30. Later in this paper, we will examine the recent extensive academic literature on
the true effect of bilateral investment treaties on investment decision and volume of FDI
inflows and outflows. The signal to credit rating agencies is clearly influenced by the mixed
results of these studies. See infra pp. 120-125.
31. Moti Bassok, Ariav's Dream: Turn Israel into a Global Financial Center,
HAARETZ (Mar. 24, 2008), availableat http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/967373.html.
32. The Israeli government, for example, rejected several attempts by the Swiss
government to initiate negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty as a prerequisite to
negotiate and sign a double taxation treaty between the two countries. As a matter of
policy, Israel did not want to signal that it is open to negotiate BITs with developed
countries, including Switzerland. Memorandum from Int'l Dept., Ministry of Fin., the
Gov't of Isr. on Bilateral Investment Treaty with Switzerland (March 4, 1997) (on file with
the author).
33. Id.
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that already preserve pro-investor
developed countries
0
34
environment simply waste valuable governmental resources.
There is also an unbalanced bargaining power between Israel
and other developed countries when it comes to investment
protection and incentives. Israel is a much smaller market than
other developed countries, which means that the main capital
movement is into Israel and not vice versa." Israel has to keep the
ability to control and regulate basic financial elements, even in the
new era of liberalization of foreign currency and financial markets
emergency regime since first
because it has been under an official
36
obtaining independence in 1948. In fact, the global financial crisis
of 2008 will increase the need to control these markets more
carefully. In previous years, when Israel did negotiate a few BITs
with other developed countries, such as Germany, those countries
refused to accept Israel's policy of restrictions on foreign
currency.3 ' This unbalanced situation that reflects a unique Israeli
Israel from promoting BITs
reality also plays a role in deterring
38
countries.
developed
other
with
When it comes to developing countries, on the other hand,
Israel finds itself in a completely different position. Israel is
consistently trying to negotiate and sign BITs with developing
countries, especially where it has an interest in protecting Israeli
investments in an unstable economy, such as in the Russian
Federation case.39 As previously discussed, Israel has become an
34. Public funds are needed to fund negotiation, implementation of and compliance
with a treaty. On the transactional costs of international treaties, see William J. Alceves,
InstitutionalistTheory and InternationalLegal Scholarship,12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
227, 244 (1997).
35. See Economy: The National Economy, Isr. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Apr. 1,
2008).
36. See Defence (Finance) Regulations, 1941 (Palestine Gazette, Supp. No. 2, 1053).
37. Israel-Germany BIT, supra note 29, art. 7.
38. Israel did negotiate and sign several BITs with developed countries, such as
England, France, Canada, and Italy, at times when Israel's economy was still considered
an unstable economy. These agreements are not applicable anymore, and the Israeli
government is not willing to renew them due to reasons mentioned in the previous
discussion.
39. A growing number of Israeli investments in Russia and several cases of
expropriation of such investments brought about extensive negotiations between the two
governments. Nevertheless, as of today, the parties could not come to an agreement,
mainly due to Russia's desire to maintain absolute control of the dispute settlement
mechanism in case of expropriation. Memorandum from Int'l Dep't, Ministry of Fin.,
Gov't of Isr., on Bilateral Investment Treaties - Status (January 30, 2005) (on file with the
author).
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emerging source of outflow investments worldwide, exposing
Israeli investors to new political and economic risks. Among such
risks are direct and indirect expropriation, nationalization, lack of
dispute resolution and compensation mechanism in case of
expropriation, and inability to freely transfer funds.4 o Protecting
these investors has become one of the main goals of Israel's BIT
policy. Bilateral investment treaties can provide effective solutions
to some of these risks when investors are not covered by foreign
trade risk insurance policies.41 It is also important to note that
Israel is using its bargaining power against its developing
counterparts to include certain rights or exceptions in investment
treaties to protect its own national interests, such as the ability to
control certain industries in times of a national emergency.
The protection of Israeli investors by investment treaties in
foreign countries raises the question of Israel's obligation to
protect its citizens and their property abroad, and how this
obligation can be satisfied. Although these questions are beyond
the limits of this article, it should be noted that international law
scholarship and jurisprudence has increased the level of diplomatic
protection of citizens under international law paradigms to include
.43
property in a foreign territory.
B. Investment Encouragement
Protection of foreign investment in an unstable economy is
not the only dimension of the bilateral investment treaty. As
defined by the majority of treaties, a BIT is also designed to signal
a friendly environment towards foreign direct investment in the
40. See Patrick J. Donovan, Creeping Expropriationand MIGA: The Need for Tighter
Regulation in the Political Risk Insurance Market, 7 GONZ. J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (2003-04); see
also Mark L. Muzere, The Effects of Restricting Capital Outflows on Investment In an
Open Economy, 22 J. APPLIED Bus. RES. 15, 16 (2006).
41. U.N. Ctr. on Transnational Corp. [UNCTP], Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1 10,
U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/65 (1988).
42. See, e.g., Agreement between the State of Israel and Serbia and Montenegro for
the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Isr.-Serb. & Mont., July 28,
2004, art. 7(1), available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/treaties/israel bilateral agreements
(allowing the parties to take measures strictly necessary for the maintenance or protection
of its essential security interest).
43. The leading case on this matter was the Barcelona Traction Case. See The
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4 (Feb. 5) ("When a
State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals . . . it is bound to
extend to them the protection of the law. . . .").
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host country, and thus fosters investment regardless of whether the
host country is developed or still developing." However, as will be
discussed later in this paper, empirical studies still show conflicting
of BITs as a tool for increasing
results as to the effectiveness
45
foreign investment. As a result, the assumption that investment
treaties will necessarily increase foreign investments either in
Israel or in another potential host country remains unresolved.
Consequently, this component is no longer 46a fundamental element
in the Israeli administration's BIT strategy.
Despite the potential risks associated in BITs with developed
countries mentioned above, several attempts have been made in
recent years to initiate BIT negotiations with developed countries
and to encourage investment in the Israeli market. For example,
there were talks with South Korea over a bilateral agreement
between the states (which includes an investor-state dispute
settlement mechanism) and an incentives agreement between a
state and an individual corporation (which provides companyspecific incentives in connection w.ith the investment).4 7
C. Exports and Global Trends
In order to increase the Israeli export base abroad, and
assuming that an investment treaty can promote this goal through
a nexus of investment and trade, Israel is encouraging foreign
Israeli investments in developing countries. This is especially
encouraged through Israeli multinationals, such as those involved
in R&D, production and distribution centers, as well as joint
44. See, e.g., U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 6 ("Recognizing that agreement on the
treatment to be accorded such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the
economic development of the Parties").
45. See, e.g., Zachary Elkins, Andrew T. Guzman and Beth A. Simmons, Competing
for Capital: The Diffusion of BilateralInvestment Treaties, 1960-2000, 60 INT'L ORG. 811,
843 (2006) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association (September 2, 2004)).
46. Interview with Dan Catarivas, Dir. of the Int'l Dep't, Ministry of Fin., the Gov't
of Isr., in Jerusalem, Isr. (December 2004).
47. The Israeli government expressed its willingness to sign individual BITs with
South Korea's conglomerates Samsung and LG in 2005, in addition to the already existing
state-state investment treaty between the countries, in order to increase their investments
in Israel. Clearly, this governmental policy reflects the confusion between a bilateral
investment treaty between states and an Israeli governmental contract that includes
company-specific investment incentives linked to the investment in Israel. See Kim Sungjin, Israelseeks investment treaty with Chaebol, KOREA TIMES, January 18, 2005, available
at http://www.bilaterals.org/spip.php?page=print&id article=1205.
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ventures and technology cooperations.4 8 Israel is using BITs to
foster such investments,
and has already signed such agreements
49
with China, India, South Korea, and other Eastern European
countries, where it has strong economic interests. For that reason,
Israeli officials take the position that Israel should be interested in
signing investment treaties with Russia, Singapore, Brazil, Chile,
and other South American countries that would expose Israeli
investors to significant export growth potential. 0
D. PoliticalPreferences and Budget Constrains
Since government funds are usually limited, another factor
considered by the Israeli government in its BIT policy is the level
of political importance of the treaty, in addition to the economic
impact. Several developing countries have actively initiated BIT
negotiations with Israel, believing an investment treaty with a
strategic country like Israel may improve their diplomatic and
economic position in the international arena." Even so, Israel has
a relatively low interest in some of these developing nations and
does not enter into negotiations unless it gets an official request
These proposed BITs negotiations are
from the other party.
perceived by the Israeli government as an unnecessary use of
53
valuable resources.
In spite of this policy, the Israeli government tends to use
investment treaties as a political 'carrot' when a diplomatic mission
is visiting Israel and there 'is a need, or momentum, for a

48. Chalamish, supra note 1, at 312.
49. Israel-India diplomatic and economic relations had a special importance in Israel
foreign policy. Protection against nationalization and expropriation in India caused the
Israeli government to initiate BIT negotiations with India in 1994, which subsequently led
to an agreement in 1996. See Memorandum from Int'l Dep't, Ministry of Fin. of the State
of Isr., on Basic Principles with Respect to Bilateral Investment Agreements, Section F
(Apr. 12, 1994) (on file with author).
50. Memorandum from Int'l Dep't, Ministry of Fin., Gov't of Isr., on Work Plan for
Fiscal Year 2003, 15 (on file with the author).
51. This is the motive behind recent applications from Central American countries,
such as Guatemala, to initiate BIT negotiations with Israel. Interview with Hadassah
Greenberg, Deputy Dir. Treaties Dep't, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gov't of Isr., in
Jerusalem, Isr. (Dec. 2004).
52. See Boneh, supra note 26, at 57.
53. Adnon Interview I, supra note 18.
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substantial agreement to be signed.54 The BIT between Israel and
Mongolia serves as a good example of this practice.55 However, the
economic significance and the actual results of such agreements
remain somewhat questionable.
E. Summary
Due to new geopolitical challenges and economic
developments, protecting Israeli investments in the developing
world has been guiding the Israeli administration since the early
1990s, when negotiating and signing BITs became a significant
phenomenon in the international economic community. Although
fostering investment inflows into Israel and other diplomatic
motives also play a certain role in the BIT process, protecting
investments under threat and providing effective remedies remain
the central focus of Israel's BIT strategy. This strategy has shaped
the textual and structural nature of Israeli BITs over the years,
which in turn reflect and promote such a strategy. The following
sections will describe the reasons for, and the development of, the
structure and the text of Israeli BITs as a result of the evolving
strategy discussed above. The discussion takes place in light of a
proposed new model, and in comparison with both similar and
different trends in other legal regimes.

IV.

THE NEW ISRAELI DRAFT MODEL BITHISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT

Bilateral investment treaties are typically drafted based on
existing models. The models are very similar to each other as they

share similar

sources

56

and similar

substantive rights and

54. See Work Plan for Fiscal Year 1998, § 1(c) (Isr.) (on file with author). The
following countries were identified for this purpose: Uruguay, Venezuela, Bolivia,
Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Ghana.
55. During the Mongolian mission visit to Israel in 2003 the parties signed a BIT as
part of the parties' attempt to normalize diplomatic and economic relations without a
concrete demand to encourage investments in Mongolia or to protect current and
potential Israeli investors there. See Agreement Between the Government of the State of
Israel and the Government of Mongolia for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of
Investments, Isr.-Mong., Nov. 25, 2003, available at http://www.mfa.gov.ill
Israel[hereinafter
mfa/usercontrols/TreatFile.aspx?SAFA=2&AMANA=1905-A
Mongolia BIT].
56. For example, the treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation that were aimed
to establish closer economic and cultural ties between allies in the second half of the 19th
century. See McLachlan, supra note 4 at 26.
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obligations included in the treaty," all of which frequently reflect
customary international law in the field. Since the first Israeli
58
investment treaty between Israel and Germany, Israel has
consistently used a draft model investment treaty (the "Old
Model' or "Old Israeli Model").59 This was based on already
negotiated or signed investment treaties worldwide, even though
the surrounding legal and economic circumstances have changed
dramatically over the years.
In April 2000, the Israeli government decided to reevaluate
the Old Model. This was done by examining past experiences of
Israel and other countries utilizing BITs and by looking at recent
developments in international investment law, including arbitral
cases and customary law. There was a growing need to provide
drafting solutions to problems that emerged in treaty
interpretation practice. Recent macroeconomic trends in the
global economy and the Israeli market also called for reassessment
of the Old Model.
Hence, to proppse a new model, a cross-governmental team,
composed of the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Justice, and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs members was established to assess
the Old Model from economic, legal, and diplomatic perspectives.
It was also expected that the new model would solve substantial
drafting problems and anticipate future dilemmas. After several
years of extensive work, the "New Model" was approved by the
Israeli administration in the beginning of 2004, consequently
allowing BIT negotiations to begin and 'frozen' negotiations to
recommence. The next section will discuss in more detail some of
57. E.g., national treatment and most-favored-nation, fair and equitable treatment
and investor-state dispute settlement resolution. Id. at 30.
58. The Treaty between the Government of the State of Israel and the Federal
Republic of Germany concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Promotion and
Protection of Investments was signed on June 24, 1976, and entered into force temporarily
on August 28, 1980. See Israel-Germany BIT, supra note 29. However, the investment
treaties movement already started in 1959 by the US-Pakistan treaty, which has been
followed by a wave of agreements that shaped the first Israeli model.
59. Israeli Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (on file with author) [hereinafter Old
Model BIT].
60. The Israeli government deliberately froze its negotiations with several countries,
including the Philippines, in order to renew them based on the New Model. However, in
cases where the negotiations were in an advanced stage, Israel avoided restarting the
negotiations and preferred to continue the negotiations based on the Old Model. This was
the case with Mongolia and Ethiopia, with which Israel recently signed BIT agreements
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the main reasons that led to the reexamination of the Old Model,
while a later section will examine the potential consequences of
the modifications in the New Model.
A. The New BITs-A New Global Trend
Around the year 2000, several countries realized that recent
developments in international investment law might have made
parts or all of their existing BITs somewhat obsolete. This required
a closer look at the structure and content of BITs used for
previous negotiations in light of the changes that had occurred. In
many cases, these nations discovered that a particular drafting did
not follow recent arbitral decisions made by international
tribunals, did not appear to be in the best interest of a specific
country, or did not reflect a cohesive governmental strategy.
Moreover, they expressed the need to add certain new provisions
that had not been included in the model treaty but reflect new
trends and concepts in public international law.
In addition, several governmental and non-governmental
organizations have released new drafts of the model BIT, which
better protect the interests of developing countries and integrate
human rights elements into the treaty. These organizations
claimed that investment treaties protect foreign investors without
supporting development in local host communities. 3 As a result,
several forums were created in order to facilitate a dialogue among
legislators from various countries and non-governmental
organizations to examine the feasibility of integrating certain
provisions of the NGOs' proposals into BITs.
based on the Old Model. Memorandum from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gov't of Isr.,
Treaties Dept. on Status of BITs (August 20, 2003) (on file with the author).
61. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], Research Note,
Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements, 6, U.N. Doc.
For instance, recent investment
UNCTAD/WEB/ITE/IIT/2005/1 (Aug. 30, 2005).
jurisprudence expended the most-favored-nation principle to include procedural rights
within the treaty. Most draft models BITs do not include any exceptions for procedural
rights despite the resistance of part of the legal community to include them.
62. One of these drafts was published by the International Institute for Sustainable
Development, a well-regarded Canadian research institute in April 2005. Full text of the
draft is available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment-model-int-agreement.pdf.
63. See, e.g., IISD Model Agreement, supra note 8 at iii.
64. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) was an
important player in facilitating such a dialogue in developing countries to strengthen the
development component of the text of the bilateral investment treaty.
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Furthermore, several governments explored the possibility of
integrating investment incentives into existing draft BITs. In fact,
this proposal offers to combine two traditional treaties, a bilateral
investment treaty and a tax treaty, in order to create an inclusive
investment treaty that bilaterally governs direct investment
between two states.
As a result, several new models have been created. The most
influential model in this field of law, the U.S. 2004 draft model
BIT, has been designed as part of this .global wave and was
published in February 2004.66 The New Israeli Model, which was
released in light of the aforementioned global trend, faced some of
the same issues the U.S. 2004 Model BIT struggled with.
The U.S. 2004 Model BIT will serve as a point of reference to
analyze the process underlying the Israeli transition from the Old
Model to the New Model because it aims to implement recent
developments in investment treaty jurisprudence, offers several
drafting solutions, and introduces innovative arbitration concepts.
B. Continuing Violations of Former Treaties- The National
Treatment Principle
Several ongoing discrimination practices of the Israeli
government that block foreign investment in certain industries or
favor Israeli investors over foreign investors once an investment is
made, indicate that Israel is potentially in constant violation of the
investors' protection standards in its BITs. These include, inter
alia, anti-discrimination provisions. The foreign investors'
community has expressed its dissatisfaction with the current -legal
regime in several forums. As a result, the Israeli Attorney General
recommended reexamination of the Old Model and development
of a new one that will follow Israel's investment policy and
national commitments with respect to investors' protection
standards.

65. For the importance of tax coordination in the global markets, see generally
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization,Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare
State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1573-1676 (2000).
66. Treaty Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment,
availableat http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files[U.S.*%20model%20BIT.pdf.
67. Admon Interview I.
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The national treatment principle, which is a pillar of modern
bilateral investment treaties, has not been strictly followed by
existing practices in Israel. The principle requires that the host
country treats investors or investments no less favorably than it69
treats its own national investors, or investments made by them.
Similar to other developing countries, 0 Israel had recognized the
limited financial resources available to its own national
corporations compared to foreign multinational corporations. In
order to give a boost to certain local industries, Israel prohibited
foreign corporations from competing in those industries and
excluded them from grants and subsidies available to its own
nationals. Although the majority of these practices have been
eliminated as Israel became a more market-based economy in the
last several decades, some are still in place.
A model investment treaty should be sensitive to this tension,
and the reevaluation of the Old Israeli Model did take it into
account. The fact that many of the above mentioned investment
restrictions prevent certain investments from entering Israel does
not, in and of itself, violate the national treatment principle of
investment treaties, since the national treatment principle only
applies once an investment is already made. Israel continues to
hold a 'post-establishment' policy, 71 which protects an investment
against discrimination after it has already been established.7 2 Since
market liberalization is one of the common goals of modern BITs,
there is room for discussion as to whether Israeli BITs actually
serve this goal through this policy, and whether a revised model
should follow a 'pre-establishment' approach.

68. See, e.g., MCLACHLAN, supra note 4, at 251-54 (discussing the importance of the
national treatment principle and its interpretation in .investor-state arbitration
procedures).
69. See id.
70. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV. [UNCTAD], BILATERAL

INVESTMENT TREATIES IN THE MID-1990S, 64-65 U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/7, U.N.
Sales No. E.98.II.D.8 (1998).

71. Organization of American States dictionary of trade terms will be used to define
"post-establishment" http://www.sice.oas.org/dictionary/IN-e.asp
72. Israeli officials are currently debating whether Israel should include 'preestablishment' investment treatment in its BITs based on the new Japanese model, which
was implemented in the Japan-South Korea Bilateral Investment Treaty. For the Japanese
BITs and investment liberalization provisions. see Japan Grows Positive on Bilateral
Investment Treaties, JAPAN ECON. REV., Feb. 15, 2004, at 3.
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In general, the Old Model of the Israeli BIT adhered to the
broad language of the national treatment principle." Originally
drafted in the 1960's when the BITs movement had just begun, the
text of the Old Model reflected the development of the openmarket policy. Yet even then, Israel conducted several
discriminatory practices and other exceptions to the national
treatment standard as applied to existing investments. Although
Israel encouraged forein investment through an open door and
equal treatment policy, certain restrictions were imposed. As a
result, when Israel has negotiated BITs that accepted a broader
interpretation of the national treatment provision than it did itself,
there was a potential for serious disagreement. The recent
negotiation with Mexico, which pushes for a NAFTA-type BIT
model," is a good example for such difficulties.*
Consequently, Israel's discriminatory policy has an impact on
the evolving investment treaty model and long-term planning of
BIT negotiations in Israel, while defining the scope of national
treatment protection in various agreements. Indeed, the New
Model suggests a narrower legal definition for the 'national
treatment' obligation than the Old Model, accompanied by specific
and general exceptions.7 However, a careful examination shows
that Israel replaced the exceptions list of the Old Model with a
new general provision." Moving forward, the discussion will turn
to the development of the national treatment protection in detail,
within the Israeli investment law context.
73.

Compare Old Model BIT, supra note 59, art. 3 with BILATERAL INVESTMENT

TREATIES INTHE MID-1990S, supra note 70, at 58-59.
74. In many cases Israel even gives foreign investors additional controversial grants
and tax benefits in order to attract them to invest in Israel. In the case of land
expropriation, foreign investors unofficially receive a higher compensation than Israeli
nationals. While Israeli nationals receive between 70 and 80 percents of the market value
of the land, foreign investors can get up to 100 percents, according to Minister of Finance
unofficial concession. Interview with Mr. Berris, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Ministry of Fin.,
the Gov't of Isr., in Jerusalem, Isr. (Dec. 2004).
75. For the current status of these negotiations with the Mexican government, see
Memorandum from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gov't of Isr., Bilateral Investment
Treaties - Status (Jan. 30, 2005) (on file with author).
76. Article 7 of the New Model includes a security interest exception and other
general exceptions related to international commitments in international agreements, such
as tax, trade, IP and former investment treaties. See Israeli Model Bilateral Investment
Treaty (on file with author) [hereinafter New Model BIT].
77. Compare Old Model BIT, supra note 59, art. 7 with New Model BIT, supra note
76, art. 7.
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C. PoliticalChanges-PostSeptember 11 Era
The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States
reshaped multiple legal areas worldwide. Western nations
developed an array of new legal tools to combat terrorism and old
regulations necessarily adjusted to the new reality. Israel, which
was subject to terrorism long before the September 11 attacks, was
no exception. The newly-formed Department for International
Agreements and International Litigation in the Israeli Ministry of
Justice reviewed past international agreements and newly
negotiated ones in light of new international law and Israeli
foreign policy," which was influenced by global security trends.
Thus, some modifications have been made to the Old Model as a
response to the security aspects of foreign direct investment.
The dominant example is the new Article 7, Section 1, of the
New Model that deals with national security interests." The New
Model supports admission of foreign investment as a general rule,
and like many other international investment instruments, also
includes exceptions to the national treatment and most-favorednation standards in order to protect certain economic sectors or
address public policy concerns.o The Israeli government followed
several other investment treaty models, which include a separate
national security exception that allows the parties to take

78. For a detailed description of the responsibilities of this department, see The
Department for International Agreements and International Litigation and the Foreign
http://www.justice.gov.il/MOJEng/The+Department+for+
Division,
Relations
International+Agreements+and+International+Litigation+and+the+Foreign+Relations+
D/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2010). The fact that several different governmental ministries and
departments are involved in the process of BITs making raises serious questions about
which entity has the authority to negotiate these agreements and what is the status of their
legality. See Letter from Zvi Tene, Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Dir. Gen. of the
Ministry of Fin. (Apr. 6, 1998) (stressing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' exclusive
authority to sign and ratify international agreements, although several governmental
bodies can participate in the negotiation process) (on file with author).
79. New Model BIT, supra note. 76, art. 7.
80. Thomas Pollan's study of regulation of FDI admission and its exceptions reveals
two kinds of exceptions. First, economic sectors, which are exempted from international
competition in order to develop and protect infant national industries. Second, public
policy exceptions, which commonly include security, public order, health and life, public
morals and culture. See THOMAS POLLAN, LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ADMISSION OF

FDI 199-214 (Eleven International Publishing 2006).
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discriminatory security measures."' These measures are specifically
essential in times of conflict, but they are frequently used as
preventive measures against existing and potential threats to
national and international security. The exception and its
limitations will be further discussed later in this article.
D. The Real Impact of BilateralInvestment Treaties
While our discussion so far has focused on the implications
and potential benefits of investment treaties, the costs of bilateral
investment treaties should not be ignored. Planning, negotiating,
implementing, and enforcing BITs require government
expenditure of significant human and financial resources.82 While
some BITs are negotiated in a relatively short time frame with no
significant attention to future implementation or enforcement,
many other treaties require long and extensive cross-border83
negotiations and thorough inter-governmental implementation.
An effective treaty will also lead to binding legal procedures,
through which a signatory government will have to defend itself in
a direct investor-state litigation brought by foreign investors who
are protected by the BIT. All these governmental functions
involve valuable public resources, that can otherwise be channeled
to many other public needs.84 In addition to these economic costs,
investment treaties involve political costs as they force developing
countries to trade their sovereignty for a commitment to be subject
and investment
investment regulation
to international
81
arbitration. In order to deal with the 'credible commitment'
problem, according to which developing governments may
expropriate an investment once it is sunk, they limit their
legislative and local judicial powers to signal a commitment to

81. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 7 ("Either Contracting Party may take
measures strictly necessary for the maintenance or protection of its essential security
interests.").
82. See Alceves, supra note 34, at 244.
83. This is many times the case when the BIT has only a symbolic value and serves a
diplomatic purpose. A good example will be the bilateral investment treaty with Mongolia
discussed above.
84. Alceves, supra note 34, at 244.
85. More on the notion of trading sovereignty for international commitments, see
Wenhua Shan, Is Calvo Dead?, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 123 (2007).
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in the future and increase foreign
protect foreign investments
86
direct investment inflows.
The substantial costs associated with BITs raise the questions
of whether BITs actually promote foreign investment and increase
FDI flows into the host state, and if an investment treaty is the
most cost-effective international legal tool to achieve the goal and
desired benefits.
The Israeli cross-functional team, which had to evaluate the
Old Model and existing BITs for the purpose of proposing the
New Model, also considered the impact of BITs and their costeffectiveness as part of its analysis.88 However, no empirical study
has been conducted, by the team or any other governmental
agency, which examines the actual growth of FDI to or from an
individual country as a result of signing a BIT with that country,
the aggregate impact on FDI inflows under the BITs regime, or
whether a BIT is a cost-efficient tool to protect foreign investors in
Israel.89 Nevertheless, the conducted interviews demonstrate that
the cross-functional team, the current leadership of the
international department at the Ministry of Finance, and the Israel
Export Insurance Corp. Ltd (ASHRA),90 are all well aware that
the effectiveness of the treaties is questionable. 91 Thus, the
government likely recognizes it should carefully prioritize the
86. See id.
87. Bilateral investment treaty is not the only instrument to protect foreign
investment. Other common alternatives include an investment contract with the host state
which provides commitment to protect the investment and to send any future disputes to
arbitration, political risk insurance policy that is usually subsidized or administrated by the
home country and offers a full compensation, and local national laws that protect foreigil
investors. For an overview of the various legal instruments to protect foreign investment,
see SHERtF H. SEID, GLOBAL REGULATION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 33-62
(Ashgate Publishing Limited 2002).
88. Interview with Mr. Berris, Deputy Gen. Counsel, Ministry of Fin., the Gov't of
Isr., in Jerusalem, Isr. (Dec. 2004); Interview with Mr. Mayor Admon, Int'l Dep't, Ministry
of Fin., the Gov't of Isr., in Jerusalem, Isr. (Dec. 2004).
89. In fact, the author is not aware of such comprehensive study of BITs conducted by
any government so far.
90. ASHRA is a government-owned Ion-term political-risk insurance entity. As of
today, ASHRA is refusing to take into account bilateral investment treaties as one of the
variables to be included in its insurance premium calculation. However, following the
government's request, ASHRA is in the process of evaluating the potential impact of BITs
on insurance premiums. Memorandum from Int'l Dep't, Ministry of Fin., the Gov't of Isr.
on Bilateral Investment Treaties 2007-2806 (Nov. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Bilateral
Investment Treaties].
91. Admon Interview I, supra note 18.
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schedule of countries with whom Israel would be interested in
signing a BIT, and protect Israel's interests during BIT
negotiations.9 A discontinuation of the BIT regime in Israel is not
a real option currently, despite its questionable impact due to the
global wave of these treaties. Hence, a discussion on a broader
level regarding the effectiveness of BITs is warranted.
Empirical studies and theoretical discussions about whether
BITs actually work have recently fostered a lively academic
debate.93 Academics have not yet paid much attention to the
significant macroeconomic costs of such treaties. In general,
economic analysis entered the field of international law in a
slower, more gradual manner than it did into other legal fields.
Yet, it is definitely a growing phenomenon.
The existence of a BIT as an investment protection tool is one
of the elements considered in investment decisions.94 However,
recent research showed that BITs only play a minor role in such
decisions 95 and, in fact, most executives in multinational
corporations are unaware of BITs and their implications when
investment allocations are made.96 Several empirical studies, using
different sets of assumptions and models, recently reached
conflicting and ambiguous results with respect to the correlation
and causation between FDI levels and bilateral investment
treaties. 97 Accordingly, while Eric Neumayer and Laura Spess
92.

Id.

93. For the growing impact of economic analysis on international law, see generally,
JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 138-39
(Oxford University Press, Inc. 2005); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic
Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 28-33 (1999); Symposium, Rational
Choice and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S1 (2002); Alan 0. Sykes, The
Economics of Public InternationalLaw (Chi. Working Paper Series, John M. Olin Law &
Econ. Paper No. 216, 2004), availableat http://ssrn.com/abstract=564383.
94. The common formula in the economic literature is FDI=f[BITs(+); M(+); G(+);
E(+), I(-); W(+); R(-); CF(?)]. See Boneh, supra note 26, at 55.
95. See, e.g., Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Mid-1990s, supra note 70.
96. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETrER INVESTMENT
CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE 177 (The World Bank 2005) (according to the report, many
investors may not be aware of existing BITs when they make locational decisions and may
in fact "remain oblivious until some issue arise when its provisions may be relevant.").
97. See Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work: An
Evaluation of BilateralInvestment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain,46 HARV. INT'L L.J.
67 (2005); Tim Buithe & Helen V. Milner, The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into
Developing Countries: Increasing FDI'through Policy Commitment via Trade Agreements
and Investment Treaties (Aug. 20, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p mla-apa-research-citation/0/5/9/8/5/p59852_index.ht
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showed in 20059 that developing countries that have signed more
BITs are likely to receive more FDI in return," Jason Yackee used
a slightly different analysis. Yackee brought forth counter
evidence showing that BITs are actually statistically significant
predictors of FDI share only for low-risk countries and that in
some cases it is impossible to say that BITs have any positive
marginal effect that is statistically significant. 100
While the empirical results. are conflicting, several theoretical
studies come to the conclusion that a 'race to the bottom' is the
engine behind the BITs. This hurts the sovereignty of developing
nations. Accordingly, a developing country will101sign a BIT when its
capital-importing competitor has also done so.
Israel's policy to conclude BITs with developing countries
based on both political and economic self-interest can be partially
supported by some of the aforementioned studies. In a similar
economic framework to aid allocation among nations, Eric
Neumayer showed how developed countries sign BITs with
102
countries where they have-special economic or political interests.
The host state's need for development is also taken into account.
Indeed, several least developed countries signed BITs with Israel
ml); Peter Egger & Michael Pfaffermayr, The Impact of BilateralInvestment Treaties on
Foreign Direct Investment, 32 J. OF COMP. ECON. 788-804 (2004); Kevin P. Gallagher &
Melissa B.L. Birch, Do Investment Agreements Attract Investment? Evidence from Latin
America, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE, 961, 961-74 (2006); Jennifer Tobin & Susan RoseAckerman, When BITs Have Some Bite: The Political-Economic Environment for
Bilateral Investment Treaties (Nov. 14, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
at
http://www.law.yale.eduldocuments/pdfl
Law
Jouinal,
available
Yale
WhenBITsHaveSomeBite.doc); Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment
Treaties Attract ForeignDirect Investment? Only a Bit... and They Could Bite (The World
2003),
available
at
http://wwwWorking
Paper
No.
3121,
Bank,
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/09/23/000094946_0
3091104060047/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf.
98. Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do BilateralInvestment Treaties Increase Foreign
Direct Investment to Developing Countries?, 33 WORLD DEV. 1567, 1567-85 (2005).
99. Id. at 1583 (according to Neumayer and Spess' study, a developing state that signs
a large number of BITs might expect to see its FDI inflows increase by up to 93%).
100. Jason Webb Yackee, Do BITs Really Work? Revisiting the Empirical Link
between Investment Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment, U. WIS. L. SCH. LEGAL STUD.
available at
1054
(Oct.
2007),
Paper
No.
SERIES,
RES.
PAPER
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015083.
101. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularityof BilateralInvestment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (1998).
102. Eric Neumayer, Self-Interest, Foreign Need, and Good Governance: Are Bilateral
Investment Treaty ProgramsSimilar to Aid Allocation?, 2 FOREIGN POL'Y ANALYSIS 245,
245-67 (2006), available at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118600496/issue.
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over the years, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (former
Zaire) and Ethiopia.1os Moreover, according to Neumayer, good
governance of the host country is not a factor in the capitalexporting country's (or home state) decision to sign a BIT. This
explains why several Israeli BITs with countries lack the
protection of democracy and human rights. A closer look at
Neumayer's results shows that geographical and cultural
proximity, as well as the size and the level of education of the
target developing state, are also considered by the developed
world.1 04 These conclusions can explain the wave of Israeli BITs
with the larger and better-educated countries within Central and
Eastern Europe since the early 1990s, with which Israel also shares
close geographical and cultural ties.
In sum, several theoretical and empirical studies can explain
why the Israeli BIT policy developed as an economic policy even
though the statistical data which does exist is too limited to draw
general conclusions. This is mainly based on Israel's need to
protect its own nationals in large developing economies, while also
strengthening political ties with those foreign economies.
The legal and economic literature has not yet provided any
comprehensive explanation as to why certain developed countries
sign more BITs than others, or the reason for the existing timeline.
The impact of the above-mentioned empirical studies on various
governments' motivation to initiate and sign investment treaties
has yet to unfold. In any case, the conclusions and their limitations
are part of the reevaluation of the Israeli BIT model, and are
continuously being considered by the Israeli administration.
This section looked at some of the main rationales behind the
Israeli government's review process of the Old Model and existing
BITs. It examined its decision to adopt the New Model in 2004,
taking into account its emerging BITs policy, which has been
adapted to the new economic and legal factors discussed earlier.
103. See.id; see also Agreement Between the Government of the Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia and the* Government of the State of Israel for the Reciprocal
Promotion
and
Protection
of
Investments,
Nov.
26,
2003,
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/ethiopia-israel.pdf [hereinafter EthiopiaIsrael BIT].
104. Neumayer, supra note 102, at 254.
105. It is important to note that all existing empirical studies have used a larger
number of bilateral investment treaties, using treaties from multiple countries and over
several decades.
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Before conducting an overview of the structure and text of the
Israeli BIT, the next section will provide the necessary background
by first reviewing the existing BITs practice in Israel since its
inception.
V. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN ISRAEL-BASIC FACTS &
FIGURES
Structural reforms, economic liberalization, and Israeli
investments in newly evolved foreign markets all contributed to
the Israeli BIT policy. Between 1976106 and 2004, Israel signed 34
agreements, four of which have not been ratified as of yet. Most of
these agreements were signed with developing countries and
emerging economies, where Israel had strong, rising investment
interests. o' In the few agreements that were signed with countries
in which Israel had no significant investment interest, the
agreements served either specific strategic or diplomatic goals, or
were part of a broader framework of international economic
agreements (trade, double-taxation, etc). The vast majority of
these agreements do not reflect reciprocal investment relations
and they strengthen Israel's status as a state in transition from a
developing to a developed economy.
108
With the exception of some recent agreements, almost all
Israeli BITs were signed between 1991 and 2000 as a result of geopolitical changes in Europe and Asia, which furthered accessibility
into new Eastern European markets and diplomatic developments
in the Middle East.' 09 Indeed, many of these countries belonged to
the former Soviet Union.11 o Only after the fall of the U.S.S.R. did
these countries open their local industries to Israeli investments
106. The first Bilateral Investment Treaty was between Israel and Germany. This
treaty was signed on June 24, 1976 and entered into force on August 28, 1980. The future
status of the treaty is under consideration in the German and Israeli governments. IsraelGermany BIT, supra note 29.
107. BilateralInvestment Treaties, supra note 90.
108. Only four agreements have been signed since the year 2000. Two of them, the
BITs with South-Africa and Serbia-Montenegro, are already based on the New Model
mentioned above. The other two, with Ethiopia and Mongolia, are based on the Old
Model since the New Model was adopted after some substantial negotiations already took
place between the parties.
109. See supra Part II.A.
110. Andrej Kreutz, Post-Communist Eastern Europe and the Middle East: The Burden
of History and New PoliticalRealities, 21 ARAB STUDIES QUARTERLY, Spring 1999, at 1,
5.
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and accommodate foreign direct investment. The Middle East
peace process has significantly improved Israel's foreign relations
with several Eastern European countries that traditionally had
close ties with Arab countries in the Middle East."' Israel initiated
BIT negotiations with these countries with the dual purpose of
encouraging Israeli investments abroad to position Israel as a
meaningful player in global markets, and to ensure investment
protection in these newly born and unstable economies. A
transition period to market economy and rule of law called for the
use of international legal tools to ensure investment protection,
which included BITs.
Although it is difficult to determine the actual impact of those
BITs fostering Israeli investments in Eastern Europe since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, at least the position of Israeli
investors in Eastern Europe is now recognizable. In some Eastern
European countries, Israelis are considered amongst the largest
investors in certain industries. They enjoy the protection of the
signed bilateral treaties, in addition to the efforts of these
governments to strengthen the rule of law and governmental
institutions in these countries." 2 For example, in Romania, which
officially joined the European Union on January 1, 2007, 2.5
percent of the companies registered with foreign capital are
Israeli-owned.13 It is important to note that while there is a mutual
economic effort from those Eastern European countries, they also
generate significant amounts of new capital and target the Israeli
economy. This trend suggests that reciprocal economic relations
between 114these unbalanced economic powers are indeed
plausible.1 It also adds another angle to the potential success of
111. See id. at 1 (discussing the relationships between the Arab world and East Europe
following the collapse of the Soviet Union).
112. Id. at 5.
113. They represent 300 million U.S. dollars of direct investments in Hungary, in
.addition to 500 million U.S. dollars of investments in defense and engineering projects.
However, more than one billion U.S. dollars are currently invested in Hungary indirectly
through European entities driven by international tax considerations. For an economic
analysis prepared by the Israel Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor, see ISRAEL
MINISTRY OF INDUS.,

TRADE AND LABOR, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ROMANIA,

http://moit.gov.il/NR/rdonlyres/6151549D-AF7D-43BD-8BAl7D23AB8F54D1/0/skira-romania.doc.
114. The majority of this capital comes from Russia. However, Israel-Russia BIT
negotiations have not been successful as of yet due to several disagreements on currency
control and dispute resolution mechanism. Admon Interview I, supra note 18.
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the BIT mechanism-creating a positive, investor-friendly
environment. The latter is not very telling, however, as Israel
already provides a high level of legal protection to its foreign
investors, and this component does not play a major role in
A careful examination of governmental
Israeli BIT policy.
reports and interviews conducted by the author reveals the
following with respect to existing BITs and the current Israeli
policy towards negotiating future BITs.
First and foremost, Israel does not tend to sign BITs with
countries that, at the time of signing, are developed countries. It
instead uses these agreements to protect Israeli investors abroad in
emerging and unstable economies, because such protection is
simply unnecessary in developed countries. Nevertheless, the
government has been reassessing the New Model, which was
designed in 2003, in order to determine whether the New Model
can be adjusted and extended to developed countries. A future
model may adopt several North American models and include
investment liberalization provisions. These provisions open new
economic sectors in developed countries to foreign investments, or
provide investment incentives for certain investors in underinvested industries or geographical areas. Because investment
treaties in Israel have traditionally followed the European models,
which do not include such provisions, it is not surprising that
Israeli BIT policy does not currently include negotiating
investment treaties with developed economies.
Second, membership in multinational organizations based on
high macro-economic standards is a good indication for the legal
and economic strength of the country's economy, and the
country's level of protection of foreign investors. Therefore, Israel
does not initiate or sign BITs with Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) member states, and
recently put a halt to its negotiation with Mexico, an OECD

115. For ranking of the Israeli economy for business purposes, see THE WORLD BANK
& THE INT'L FIN. CORP., DOING BUSINESS 2008 (The World Bank 2007), available at
http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/FullReport/2008/DB08_FullReport.pdf
[hereinafter DOING BUSINESS 2008].

116. BilateralInvestment Treaties,supra note 90.
117.

Id.
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118

member state. Similarly, Israel canceled its BIT agreements with
Poland and Czech Republic after they joined the European Union
in 2004.119 This raises a broader question regarding the status of
BITs as bilateral agreements when one of the parties dissolves as a
sovereign state and the identity of the succeeding entity is not
clearly defined. For instance, the.European Union and Israel are
currently negotiating the future status of BITs that were signed
between Israel and countries that joined the EU since the
ratification of that particular BIT.120 In that respect, multinational
organizations can play a greater role than their indicator function
in the BIT making process. The UN Conference on Trade and
Development ("UNCTAD"), for example, aims to foster growth
in the developing world. 1 21 It could also serve as an effective forum
for Israel to negotiate and sign BITs with appropriate countries.
However, the shaky political relations' between Israel and
UNCTAD have an impact on the current and potential use of this
forum.22
118. Accord id.; Interview -with Mayor Admon, Ministry of Fin., Gov't of Isr., in
Jerusalem, Isr. (Nov. 30, 2007) (providing an explanation for the status of the negotiation
with Mexico) [hereinafter Admon Interview II].
119. Admon Interview I, supra note 18.
120. Since the EU has a separate trade and investment policy, bilateral investment
treaties of member states with third parties can be either unnecessary or inconsistent. See EU Council Conclusions on Comprehensive European International Investment Policy,
3041st Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Luxemburg, October 25, 2010, available at
http://www.consilium.europa.euluedocs/cms-data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/117328.pdfv
(discussing EU foreign investment policy after the Lisbon Treaty); For a thorough
discussion of succession of treaties in the Czechoslovakia context, see ERIC STEIN,
CZECHO/SLOVAKIA: ETHNIC CONFLICT, CONSTITUTIONAL FISSURE, NEGOTIATED
BREAKUP (University of Michigan Press 1997). In that case, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia agreed that all treaties linked exclusively with the territory of a successor state
will be inherited by that state and it was the sole responsibility of each of them individually
to negotiate with the other contracting party on the question of whether or not the treaty
should remain in force.
121. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, About UNCTAD,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD=1530&lang=1.
122. The United Nations Conferdnce on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) signed
a Memorandum of Understanding with the Center for International Cooperation
(MASHAV) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel for the Establishment
of a Programme of Cooperation, which was signed and entered into force on June 16,
1998. The objectives of the Programme, according to Article 1 of the Memorandum of
Understanding, are "to combine the professional as well as the operational resources of
UNCTAD and MASHAV in support of national and regional development efforts of
developing countries and economies in transition." See Memorandum of Understanding
with the Center for International Cooperation (MASHAV) of the Ministry of Foreign
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Third, the leading factors considered when initiating BIT
negotiations are: (1) the current and expected volume and quality
of trade and investment in the host country; and (2) the level of
legal security and protection foreign investors can enjoy in this
country. Nevertheless, while volume, type of trade and investment
are easy to measure legal instability tends to be vague and much
harder to quantify. Accordingly, Israeli officials fail to use an
objective scale to measure legal instability. An alternative such as
the several scales of government corruption designed by
international organizations such as the OECD or the World
Economic Forum could be used for this matter. Another option
could 124be ASHRA's political and economic risk classification
table.
The Israel Export Insurance Corp. Ltd. ("ASHRA") is fully
owned by the Israeli government. It encourages Israeli exports by
insuring medium and long term export credit transactions, of one
to ten years, with investments abroad."' This state-owned
company is focused on political risks, while another private
company is providing supplemental insurance against economic
risks. 26 ASHRA's current policy, unlike other rating agencies,
does not use BITs as a factor in its own ranking. 127 Although
ASHRA is reexamining its policy and is still involved in. the
governmental BIT process, the Israeli government is not using its
ranking as an authority for the BIT process. Although BIT
effectiveness is questionable, it should be considered as part of the
political risk calculation.
Fourth, even though investment and other economic interests
in a foreign country are the leading motives behind BITs,
diplomatic and national interests also influence Israeli officials. In
2003, Israel signed agreements with Ethiopia and Mongolia as part
of the diplomatic efforts to build relationships with these

Affairs of the State of Israel for the Establishment of a Programme of Cooperation, June
16, 1998 (on file with author).
123. On various ways to measure legal instability, see Bilateral Investment Treaties in
the Mid-1990s, supra note 70.
124. The table includes seven different levels of political and economic risks, available
at http://www.ashra.gov.il/DisplayClassifications.asp (last visited April 17, 2008).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. BilateralInvestment Treaties,supra note 90.
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countries.128 Also, Angola initiated BIT negotiations with Israel to
increase the already high level of foreign investment coming from
government rejected the offer
Israeli companies, but the Israeli
129
because of political constraints.
Fifth, due to the geographical nature of bilateral investment
treaties, the Israeli government avoids negotiating with countries
with unsettled borders. For example, although Israel has already
signed several economic agreements with Taiwan, the current BIT
negotiations between Israel and Taiwan have been frozen as a
result of legal opinions that question Taiwan's borders. The close
diplomatic relationship between Israel and China, which is at a
higher priority, also played a role in that decision.13
Sixth, Israeli government policy supports agreements with
trade blocks in order to strengthen economic relations with
countries that share common interests.1 12 Countries also tend to
negotiate and sign agreements more easily if their neighbors have
already signed similar agreements in the past. Israel signed BITs
with several non-EU European countries that enjoy special
relationships with the EU through some of its programs, without
being obliged by EU procedural mechanisms. These include the
European Neighborhood Policy ("ENP"), Cross Border
Cooperation Corporation, Barcelona Process, and others." As
such, Israel has recently expressed an interest in Macedonia and is

128. The Israel-Mongolia BIT was signed on November 25, 2003, and the IsraelEthiopia BIT was signed on November 26, 2003. Israel-Mongolia BIT, supra note 55;
Ethiopia-Israel BIT, supra note 103.
129. The main economic interest in Angola for Israeli investors is the diamonds mining
industry, which supports the rough and polished diamonds trading markets). Admon
Interview II, supra note 118.
130. Unlike other econ'omic agreements, most BITs cover only investments within the
geographical borders of the host country. Tax treaties, on the other hand, are usually
based on the residency test. Cortney M. Arnold, Protecting Intellectual Property in the
Developing World: Next Stop-Thailand, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 10, 10 (2006);
Robert H. Dilworth, Financing International Operations of U.S. Multinationals, 592
P.L.I./TAx 305, 322 (2003).
131. Accord Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra note 90; Admon Interview II, supra
note 118.
132. Dov Mishor, Free Trade Agreements as a Vehicle to Growth: The Israeli
Experience, 3 INT'L RES. J. L. & FIN. 56, 60 (2006), available at
http://www.eurojournals.com/IRJFE%203%206%20mishor.pdf.
133. The Serbia-Montenegro BIT was the last one to be signed. The legal department
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is examining the status and identifying the successor of
this treaty following Montenegro's independence.
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about to start negotiating with Bosnia for the same reason. 34 The
Israel BIT team will soon identify additional Balkan countries to
initiate BIT negotiations with countries within this trade block.
Similarly, the Israeli government has given a special priority
to the Central America trade block. Israel has recently initiated
negotiations with Costa Rica based on Israel's growing economic
interest in Costa Rica's trade potential and the strong diplomatic
relations between the two countries. 35 Negotiations with
Guatemala, a neighboring country with a similarly increasing
economic interest, have led to a signed agreement that should soon
be ratified by the 136Israeli government pending finalization of
internal procedures.
This is similar to Israel's ongoing BIT negotiations with
Uzbekistan.'
Following signed agreements with several
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 13 such as Azerbaijan,
discussions with Uzbekistan were initiated.139 The CIS is an
international organization comprised of former soviet republics.140
It was created on December 21, 1991 and simultaneously declared
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the independence of its
members.141 The negotiations with Uzbekistan reflect Israel's
priority to negotiate BIT agreements with the remaining CIS
countries and expand its economic ties with that economic block.
134. BilateralInvestment Treaties, supra note 90.
135. Until recently, Costa Rica was the only country to have an embassy in Jerusalem
along with El Salvador. Following a diplomatic pressure from Arab states, both countries
announced in 2006 that they plan to move of their embassies and diplomatic missions from
Jerusalem to Tel Aviv.
136. The BIT with Costa Rica has not materialized as of yet. Costa Rica, which has
been simultaneously negotiating a Bilateral Trade Agreement with the United States and
a Central America Free Trade Agreement with other South American countries, tried to
avoid additional obligations via a bilateral investment treaty with Israel. Admon
Interview I, supra note 18.
137. Id.
138. BilateralInvestment Treaties, supra note 90
139. The Israel-Uzbekistan BIT was signed on July 4, 1994 and was ratified on
February 18, 1997.
140. CIS member states are: Azerbaijan Republic, Republic of Armenia, Republic of
Belarus, Georgia, Republic of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Republic of Moldova,
Russian Federation, Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan (associate member only
because it withdrew its full membership in 2005), Republic of Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.
Commonwealth
of
Independent
States
(CIS),
List
of
CIS
States,
http://cis.minsk.by/main.aspx?uid=3390 (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
141. Commonwealth of Independent States, http://www/cisstat.com/eng/cis.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2010).
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Interestingly enough, the only cases of expropriation of Israeli
investments abroad, were reported to the Israeli government in
order to receive Israel's support related to investments in CIS
142
countries. Economic arrangements among CIS members have
potential implications on BIT negotiations between Israel and CIS
members. Russia does not want to offer Israel economic privileges
similar to the ones offered to other CIS countries
by using an MFN
143
provision in a future Israel-Russia BIT. Similar obstacles can
emerge as Israel negotiates investment treaties with countries that
belong to other blocks with internal economic arrangements.
Finally, ratifying an already-executed agreement takes an
important role in the BIT governmental process, even though the
passage of time makes some government officials wonder about
the importance and implications of ratifying an agreement. In
2003, the Israeli government almost simultaneously ratified nine
BITs signed between 1998 and 2000 as a result of joint efforts by
several government agencies.144 Most of the signed BITs that the
Israeli government has not ratified will be ratified once the Israeli
government finalizes internal procedures. It is more of a

142. Because these incidents did not develop to legal claims, we have no access to
confidential correspondence between these investors and the Israeli government.
143. Among other controversial. issues, Russia also calls for a Russian government
approval for every future investment arbitration dispute, a request which has been
rejected by the Israeli government. U.S. Department of State 2009 Investment Climate
Statement - Russia, http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ics/2009/117226.htm (last visited
Feb. 7, 2010).
144. Between June 2003 and August 2003, Israel ratified the BITs between Israel and
the following countries: Cyprus, Republic of Korea, Slovak Republic, Armenia, El
Salvador, Croatia, Romania, Belarus, and Thailand. Bilateral Investment Treaties, supra
note 90; Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government
of the Republic of Cyprus for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Isr.-Cyprus,
June
17,
2003,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/usercontrols/
TreatDetails.aspx?Id=1750-A (last visited Feb. 7, 2010);
Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the State of the Republic
of Croatia for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Isr.-Croat., July
13, 2003, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/usercontrols/TreatDetails.aspx?Id=2075 (last visited
Feb. 7, 2010); Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the
Government of the Republic of Armenia for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of
Investments,
Isr.-Arm.,
June
25,
2003,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/
usercontrols/TreatDetails.aspx?Id=2038 (last visited Feb. 7, 2010). For a complete
treaties
see
of
Israeli
directory
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Treaties/Israel+Bilateral+agreements/ (last visited November
30, 2010)
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technicality since there is no real issue that would prevent the BITs
from being ratified. 4 5
However, there are several examples that reflect the
complexity of negotiating multiple treaties based on -several
models in different timelines. For instance, the Israel-South Africa
BIT was already in- the process of being ratified when the Israeli
was an ambiguity with respect to the
realized there
government
146
final text of the treaty.
Another example of this complexity is the Israel-China BIT.
This has not been ratified yet because Israel wants to cancel BITs
with Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic before it ratifies
the BIT with China. The former agreements include currency
exchange provisions which allow each government to impose
restrictions on currency transfer.147 Israel has already eliminated all
currency restrictions, but the inclusion of such provisions in the
BITs with Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic will offer
similar privileges to the Chinese government through the MFN
148
mechanism, which the Israeli government is trying to avoid. As
mentioned before, Israel ultimately canceled its agreements with
Poland and the Czech Republic after those countries joined the
European Union, since there is no need for such agreements any
longer.
With respect to Hungary, an economic cooperation
agreement and a statement of intent on R&D cooperation was
signed on February 7, 2006.149 Israel and Hungary signed the
145. Admon Interview I, supra note 18.
146. Id.
147. Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government
of the Republic of Hungary for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/usercontrols/
14,
1991,
May
Isr.-Hung.,
TreatFile.aspx?SAFA=2&AMANA=1218; Agreement Between the Government of the
State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Poland for the Promotion and
22,
1991,
May
Isr.-Pol.,
of
Investments,
Protection
Reciprocal
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/usercontrols/TreatFile.aspx?SAFA=2&AMANA=1219;
Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the
Czech Republic for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Isr.-Czech
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/usercontrols/
1997,
23,
Sept.
Rep.,
TreatFile.aspx?SAFA=2&AMANA=1715-A.
148. Id. The most-favored-nation standard ("MFN"), which prevents discrimination
among investors from different home countries, will be discussed in detail in the next
section. See infra Part VI.C.
149. Agreement on Economic Co-operation Between the Government of the State of
Israel and the Government of the Republic of Hungary, Isr.-Hung., Feb. 5, 2006, available
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agreement after Hungary became an EU member, and was aimed
at preserving Israel's bilateral relationship with Hungary outside
of the EU institutional structure.5 o Because the economic
cooperation agreement between Israel and Hungary contains
investment provisions, the BIT with Hungary can be canceled as
soon as the economic cooperation agreement is ratified, and it
paves the way for ratification of Israel-China BIT by the Israeli
government.
To conclude, the current BIT policy has been influenced by
several considerations rather than by a clear, decisive factor. On
one hand, the current BIT policy gives policy makers certain
discretion regarding the states with which they negotiate BITs. On
the other hand, the data shows several inconsistencies,' calling for
a clear prioritization of states that are candidates for BIT
negotiations. The Israeli government, indeed, is considering
shifting to such a process.' It also remains to be seen whether the
recent reduction in Israeli BIT negotiations is a temporary or
permanent phenomenon.
Although it can be explained by an existing policy, this reality
can be changed dramatically by other factors. This includes the
growing use of international tribunals to settle global conflicts and
the increasing protectionism in many developing economies as a
result of greater competition for foreign investments in times of
prospective global economic downturn.1 54 The next section will
review in detail the structure and key provisions, both procedural
and substantive, of the Israeli BITs, with a special emphasis on the
New Israeli Model as the leading framework for current and future
treaties.
at http://www.mfa.gov.illmfalusercontrols/TreatDetails.aspx?Id=2371 (last visited Feb. 7,
2010).
150. For a press coverage describing the agreement and its main provisions, see
Bilaterals.org,
Israel,
Hungary
Sign
Economic
Cooperation
Agreement,
http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?idarticle=3763 (last visited Feb. 8, 2010).
151. Admon Interview II, supra note 118.
152. Although this can be created by a change in the government's policy, there are
several non-related factors, such as frequent changes in government personnel, which
increase the level of inconsistency in the bilateral investment treaty-making process.
153. BilateralInvestment Treaties,supra note 90.
154. Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Common Law: the Soft
Law of International Tribunals,9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 515, 534-35 (2009); Janet E. Kerr, A New
Era of Responsibility: a Modern American Mandatefor CorporateSocial Responsibility, 78
UMKC L. REV. 327, 334-35 (2009).

2010]

An Oasis in the Desert

159

VI. ISRAELI BITS- STRUCTURE AND CONTENT

Generally speaking, Israeli BITs share a consistent structure,
though in some cases they use different language for specific
circumstances. Both the Old Model and the New Model define
investment, investor, returns, territory, and freely usable currency
for the specific purpose of the treaty. All agreements then provide
general statements on promotion and protection of investment, set
most favored nation and national treatment obligations as investor
protection standards, establish compensation mechanism for
losses, set the conditions for a legal expropriation, establish
repatriation of investments and returns rights, and determine the
procedures available for investor-to-state and state-to-state
dispute resolution. Israeli BITs also include a subrogation chapter
and other general provisions, such as duration, termination, and
exceptions to the treaty.
This section will discuss key definitions and other procedural
and substantive provisions of the New Model with special
emphasis on the changes made since the Old Model, including a
comparison with some international precedents. A review of
several old generation Israeli BITs show that some of these
treaties use a slightly different language than the Old Model itself.
This paper cannot cover all of these variations, but a reference will
be made whenever it is appropriate, especially when a variation
has found its way into the New Model era.
A. Key Definitions-Whatis an "Investment" and Who is an
"Investor"?
1. Which Investments are Covered by the Treaties?
Israel adopted a broad definition of "investment," aiming to
include as many investments as possible within the treaty's
protection scope. Since capital flows between Israel and its
counterparts can be unilateral, it is Israel's interest to protect all
kinds of investments made by its nationals. Increased FDI in
several sectors introduced new forms of investment by allowing
Israeli investors to market products or services without owning any
of its assets. Thus, both the Old Model and New Model use the
155. See Old Model BIT, supra note 59. See also New Model, Article 1, Section 1,
supra note 76.
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general language of "every kind of asset,"1 followed by a nonexhaustive list of examples. While earlier investments treaties
adopted a rather narrow approach and enumerated the
investments covered by the treaty, modern treaties follow a
broader approach and differ from each other by the way they limit
the coverage. The list of assets that illustrates the term
'investment' in the New Model includes:
(a) movable and immovable property, as well as any other
rights in rem, in respect of every kind of asset; (b) rights derived
from stocks, shares, bonds, debentures and other kinds of
interests in companies; (c) claims to money, goodwill and other
assets and to any performance having an economic value; (d)
rights in the field of intellectual property, including
patents,
trade marks, geographical indications, industrial designs,
technical processes, copyrights and related rights, undisclosed
business information, trade secrets and know-how,
topographies of integrated circuits and plant-breeders rights; (e)
business concessions conferred by law or under contract,
to search for, cultivate, extract or exploit
including concessions
.158
natural resources.
Although the New Model kept the "asset based" definition, it
expanded the list of examples listed in the Old Model. The
purpose was to adjust the Old Model to recently developed types
of assets in the financial markets and the intellectual propert
field,' such as debentures and undisclosed business information.
156. Old Model BIT, supra note 59, art. 1, Section 1. See also New Model, supra note
76, art. 1, Section 1(a), p. 2.
157. In fact, earlier treaties did not dedicate a separate definition for 'investment' and
left the question open. See, e.g., Exchange of Notes Between the Government of Canada
and the Government of Israel Constituting an Agreement Relating to Canadian
Investments in Israel Insured by the Government of Canada Through Its Agents, the
Export Development Corporation, Can.-Isr., May 1, 1972, 1972 Can. T.S. No. 15. Most
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties, the predecessors of the bilateral
investment treaties, do not include an 'investment' definition.
158. New Model, supra note 76, art. 1, Section 1.
159. The wording in the New Model includes new types of assets in Article 1(d) and
adds debentures to the BIT. See Old Model BIT, supra note 59, art. 1. See also New
Model, supra note 76, art. 1, Section 1(d).
160. Article 1, Section 1 of the New Model states the following:".., including, but not
limited to ... (b) rights derived from stocks, shares, bonds, debentures, and other kinds of
interests in companies . . . (d) rights in the field of intellectual property, including patents,
trade marks, geographical indications, industrial design, technical processes, copyrights
and related rights, undisclosed business information, trade secrets and know-how,
topographies of integrated circuits and plant-breeders rights ..... " Id.
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The struggle to find an appropriate definition for the term
"investment" arose from the need to differentiate between trade
and investment.161 Since investment treaties derogate state
sovereignty for the purpose of direct investor-state dispute
resolution mechanism, it is important to limit such derogation to
cases where it helps developing states
increase their welfare and
162
get a valuable kind of asset flows. Other kinds of flows, such as
by.
trade in goods and portfolio investment, are not considered
163
many economists as welfare-boosters in the same way. This
rationale will help us understand the debate in literature and case
law as to what should be included in treaty language and, as a
result, what is the scope of its investment protection. Such
understanding is necessary in order to make sure that Israeli BIT
follows the welfare rationale.
The New Israeli model, similar to Article 1(3) of the ASEAN
model,1 6 has adopted the 'illustrative list' approach. This approach
uses a general broad definition following by an illustrative list,
which emphasizes the kinds of investments which can potentially
be included,'6 ' By adopting the illustrative model, the New Model
has rejected two other dominant trends in investment agreements,
namely, the 'exhaustive list' and the 'hybrid list' treaties. The

161. The GATT system was the first system to officially separate the two economic
fields of trade and investment. See Kevin C. Kennedy, The GA TT-WTO System at Fifty, 16
WIS. INT'L L.J. 421, 485 (1997).
162. See Noah Rubins, The Notion of "Investment" in International Investment
Arbitration, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECrS 283, 287 (Norbert Horn & Stefan Kroll eds., 2004).
163. Nevertheless, 'investment' definitions in investment treaties are usually broad
enough to cover both direct investments and portfolio investments. Old Model BIT, supra
note 59, art. 1, Section 1 (". . . including, but not limited to .

..

(b) rights derived from

stocks, shares, bonds, debentures and other kind of interests in companies .... ").
164. Agreement Among the Governments of Brunei Darussalam, The Republic of
Indonesia, Malaysia, The Republic of the Philippines, The Republic of Singapore, and The
Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 1(3), Dec. 15,
1987,27 I.L.M. 612.
165. The 'investment' definition of Article 1(3) of the ASEAN treaty includes "every
kind of asset and in particular shall include, though not exclusively: (a) movable and
immovable property and any other proper rights such as mortgages, liens and pledges; (b)
shares, stocks and debentures of companies or interests in the property of such companies;
(c) claims to money or to any performed under contract having a financial value; (d)
intellectualproperty rights and goodwill; (e) business concessions conferred by law or under
contract, including concessions to search for, cultivate, extract, or exploit natural
resources.". Id.
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the NAFTA and some additional
former, mostly recognized by 167
North American agreements, defines 'investment' by a broadyet-exhaustive list of covered economic activities, along with a
negative definition that lists certain kinds of property which are
not considered investments under the treaty.
The latter model, mostly recognized by the U.S. 2004 Model
BIT and U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, includes a basic
broad definition and a non-exhaustive list like the New Israeli
Model BIT. However, that list is interpreted by explanatory notes
that narrow the broad definition by listing required characteristics
for an investment to be protected by the treaty.
The old U.S. model, designed in 1994 ("U.S. 1994 Model
BIT" or the "Old U.S. Model"), followed a similar approach to the
Israeli one. Although there are some deviations between U.S.
BITs that were based on the U.S. 1994 Model BIT,"o most of them
follow a similar language. For example, the text used in the letter
of submittal of the U.S. BIT with Bahrain"' emphasizes the broad
view adopted by the Old U.S. Model and subsequently by the New
Israeli Model. "The Treaty's definition of investment is broad,
recognizing that investment can take a wide variety of forms. . .

166. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289, 639 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
167. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, Ca.-Chile, art. G-40, Dec. 5, 1996, 36 I.L.M.
1079, 1082.
168. Under NAFTA, property which is not considered to be investments under the
treaty are claims to money that arise solely from commercial contracts for the sale of
goods or services, or from the extension of credit in connection with a commercial
transaction. See NAFTA, supra note 166, at 1139(i).
169. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, art. 15.1, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/ftalsingapore/asset-upload-file7
08_4036.pdf.
170. For example, Article 1(d) of the U.S.-Jordan BIT explicitly states that "any
change in the form of an investment does not affect its character as an investment". This
addition does not appear in all U.S. BITs and aims to solve the problem of change in
incorporation of investing entity. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Concerning the
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Jordan, July 2, 1997, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 106-30 [hereinafter U.S.-Jordan BIT],, Article 1(d).
171. Treaty Between the Government of United States of America and the
Government of the State of Bahrain Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal
Protection of Investment, U.S.-Bahr., Sept. 29,1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-25, V-XVI
(2000) [hereinafter U.S.-Bahrain Treaty].
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The Treaty provides an illustrative list of the forms an investment
may take."'
It is important to note that Israel does not include in its
"directly" or "indirectly"
"investment" . definition either
controlled investments, which the U.S.. 1994 and 2004 BIT Models
do include.'7 3 Since other intermediate companies or persons,
including those of third countries, could gain indirect ownership or
control, Israel has been influenced by its security concerns and is
not willing to offer investment protection. in the event that a
hostile entity from a third country is involved in the investment
175
structure..
As mentioned before, the U.S. 2004 Model BIT takes a
different and more qualitative approach to the "investment"
element. According to that view, the investment has to have
"characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as
the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of
gain or profit, or the assumption of risk."' 6 In spite of the fact that
this model provides an illustrative list of investment forms, it still
demands that those investment forms satisfy a qualitative
requirement.' Thus, although the list mentions debts and licenses
as forms of qualified investments,"' the comments on the text
clarify these examples in light of the qualitative test.179
Accordingly, while bonds and other long term notes are more
likely to have the necessary characteristics, immediate claims to
payments following the sale of goods or services are often
lacking.8 o In the same way, while many kinds of licenses will be
considered investments based on their characteristics, others that
172. Id.
173. U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, art. 1, Section A.
174. Although not specifically defined in the treaty, -control in this context usually
means ownership of over 50 percent of the voting stock of a company. Many other times
different arrangements will satisfy the requirement. U.S.-Bahrain Treaty, supra note 171,
at V-XVI. ("Control is not specifically defined in the Treaty; ownership of over 50 percent
of the voting stock of a company would normally convey control, but in many cases the
requirement could be satisfied by less than that proportion, or by other arrangements").
175.

See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD INVESTMENT POLICY

REVIEWS: ISRAEL 64 (2002).

176. U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, Section A, Art. 1, definition of 'investment.'
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.

180. Id.
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do not create any rights Protected under domestic law cannot
satisfy the test of the treaty.
The U.S. 2004 Model BIT mechanism allows arbitrators to
examine the characteristics of each investment beyond the formal
structure of the investment.182 Additional characteristics may be
provided by investment arbitration cases.18' The New Israeli
Model, which offers a flexible adoption of new forms of
investment through the 'illustrative model', forces arbitral
tribunals to develop a test for the 'investment' requirement
through a case-by-case analysis of the fundamental nature of the
investment.184 Consequently, both models can result in extensive
investor-state jurisprudence,, which determines the required
characteristics of investment for the purposes of investment
treaties. The new generation U.S. treaties' approach, however,
does limit the level of uncertainty that is expected from this
qualitative test.
As a matter of fact, while early investment arbitration
185
decisions did not deal with the nature of the investment, the
majority of cases since then have included a thorough discussion
analyzing whether the investment under consideration meets the
"investment" jurisdictional requirement of the investment treaty.18
The New Israeli Model has adopted a broad definition, which
covers the investments discussed so far, and is subject to the
jurisdictional interpretation developed by recent investor-state
A potential Israel-specific *jurisdictional
jurisprudence."'
limitation, however, can be imposed by the definitions article of
the New Model. Article 1, Section 4, of the New Model, which
applies protection standards to reinvestment of returns of an
original investment, provides that "a change in the form of the
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. New Model BIT, supra note 76.
185. See, e.g., Tradex Hellas SA v. Republic of Albania, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 43 (1996).
186. Consortium Groupement LESI-Dipenta V. Algeria (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/08),
Award, January 10, 2005, paragraph 24; PSEG Global Inc., The North American Coal
Corporation, and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Uretimve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Republic of
Turkey (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5), Decision on Jurisdiction, June 4, 2004., paragraph
109. For a contradicting opinion in a recent ICSID decision see Fraport AG Frankfurt
Airport- Services Worldwide v. The Republic of the Philippines (ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/25), Award, August 16, 2007.
187. New Model BIT, supra note 76.
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investment or a change in the form of the reinvestment shall not
affect their character as investments within the meaning of this
Agreement if the change is effected in accordance
with the laws
188
and regulations of the Host Contracting Party."
On one hand, this provision follows investment arbitration
to the
jurisprudence and adopts a flexible approach with respect
189
tension between the form of investment and its nature. On the
other hand, part of this provision could potentially be interpreted,
as several respondents claimed in recent arbitration cases, as a
formal recognition that the local laws of the host state define and
characterize investment.1 90 Several investment arbitration
tribunals, however, have interpreted the phrase "in accordance
with the laws and regulations" as a screening instrument for illegal
investments rather than a limitation on the definition of
investment.191 This is a common addition in many recent
investment treaty models wishing to avoid protection of illegal
investments.

192

Finally, the New Model's "investment" definition does not
include pre-investment expenditures.' 9 Common in public works
tenders procedures, these expenditures include, among other
things, financing, negotiating, engineering,
legal work,
environmental studies, and financial advisory. Although Israeli

188. Id.
189. Thus, for example, a formal international agreement for the sale of goods can be
defined as an investment if the goods are sold in connection with an existing investment.
See, e.g., S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, 8 ICSID (W. Bank) 3, 60-61 (2000) (finding no reason
why a measure that concerned goods under Chapter 3 of NAFTA could not be a measure
relating to an investor or an investment under Chapter 11 of NAFTA).
190. See, e.g., Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, 6 ICSID (W. Bank)
398, 410 (2004) (Morocco's claim).
191. E.g., Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I.-DIPENTA v. Algeria, ICSID (W. Bank)
Case No. ARBO3/08, Award, 1 24 (Jan. 10, 2005); PSEG Global Inc., 11 ICSID (W. Bank)
at 455. Contra Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Philippines, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, 400-41 (Aug. 16,2007).
192. For example, several U.S. treaties include in the "investment" definition an
additional requirement that the treaty protection is limited to investments that have been
made "in accordance with the laws and regulations" of the host state.
193. See New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 1.
194. In emerging markets that usually involve high levels of pre-investment
expenditures these expenditures play a significant role in investment decision and
investment process, and have an impact on the competitiveness of the market. See Walid
Ben Hamida, The Mihaly v. Sri Lanka Case: Some Thoughts Relating to the Status of PreInvestment Expenditures, in -INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION:
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investors have increased their participation in public works tenders
in foreign markets in recent years,'" the drafters of the New Model
did not find it appropriate to protect these costs as part of the
"investment" protection.
A careful look at "investment" definitions in other bilateral
and multilateral agreements, along with investment arbitration
jurisprudence, supports this conservative view of pre-investment
expenditures. Article 25 of the International Centre of Settlement
of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") Convention, the legal source
196
for ICSID jurisdiction, does not define "investment."
Culminating in Mihaly International Corp. v. Sri Lankal97 and
Zhinvali Development Ltd. v. Republic of Georgia,19 several
investment arbitration cases recently examined whether preinvestment costs should be included in the investment definition of
the ICSID Convention or other BITs.
Although it is hard to identify a clear precedent in those
cases, the Mihaly and Zhinvali approach reimburses investors for
their pre-investment expenditures only if there is a final agreement
to receive the investment. Thus, the conclusion of an investment
agreement retrospectively pushes pre-investment costs under the
investment umbrella. Alternatively, pre-investment expenditures
could be considered a protected investment if there is an
agreement between the investor and the host state to treat these
expenditures as such.199
As Ben Hamida points out, the Mihaly and Zhinvali tribunals
were careful to limit their holdings to the specific facts before
them. 2oo COnsequentX, future arbitral tribunals might reach
different conclusions. 1 Thus, it is not surprising that Israel, like
other countries, prefers to leave the question of pre-investment
LEADING CASES FROM THE ICSID, NAFTA, BILATERAL TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 47, 50-51 (Tod Weiler ed., 2005).

195. Market
rsrael Tenders
and
Consulting
Opportunities
Worldwide,
http://dgm.export.gov.il/tenders/SearchResult.do (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
196. See International Centre for Settlement of-Investment Disputes [ICSID], ICSID
Convention, Regulations and Rules, art. 25(1), ICSID/15 (Apr. 2006).
197. Mihaly Int'l Corp. v. Sri Lanka, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 310 (2004).
198. Zhinvali Dev. Ltd. v. Republic of Georgia, 10 ICSID (W. Bank) 3 (2003).
199. Mihaly, 6 ICSID (W. Bank) at 322; Zhinvali, 10 ICSID (W. Bank) at 100; Ben
Hamida, supra note 194, at 74-75.
200. Ben Hamida, supra note 194, at 74-75.
201. Indeed, at least on tribunal has reached a different conclusion regarding preinvestment expenditures. Nagel v. Czech Republic, 13 ICSID (W. Bank) 30, 91-92 (2003).
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expenditures to ad-hoc procedures rather than to include it within
the "investment" definition in the Israeli BIT.
In any case, it seems that when a state explicitly excludes preinvestment expenditures from "investment" protection through a
contract provision,
arbitration tribunals will follow the language of
202
the contract. An examination of the Israeli government public
tenders' language reveals that Israel, in fact, follows this
recommendation and opts out pre-investment expenditures when a
203
bidder loses its bid.
2. Who is an "Investor" for the Purposes of the Treaty?
Bilateral investment treaties protect investments made by
investors from home states in host territories. Although
investment treaties generally cover a broad range of types of
investments, we have seen that different BITs take different
approaches towards defining "investment" in order to encourage
desired foreign investments and protect investments that primarily
enhance host state's development. An "investor" definition, on the
204
other hand, tends to be universal, with some common variations.
This section will elaborate on several legal problems that
demonstrate the complexity of the "investor" element of Israeli
and other countries' BITs.
That investment treaties differentiate between natural
persons and legal entities is clear, as natural persons have to meet
the "nationality" requirement in order to be protected by an
investment treaty, whereas legal entities do not. With
respect to
205
natural persons, several treaties, including NAFTA, expand the
202. See Ben Hamida, supra note 194, at 76.
See, e.g., MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FOR PRIVATIZATION MATTERS, THE
203.
SALE PROCEDURE FOR THE SALE OF THE
GOVERNMENT COMPANY AUTHORITY,
SHARES HELD BY THE STATE OF ISRAEL IN THE ISRAEL GOVERNMENT COINS AND
MEDALS CORPORATION LTD. PRIVATE COMPANY NUMBER 51-0298573, at 29-30 (2007)

(Israel).
204. See, e.g., U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 6-7; Agreement Between the
Government of the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic of Uzbekistan for
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Isr.-Uzb., art. 1, July 4, 1994,
1997
U.N.T.S.
107,
available
at
Israelhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/usercontrols/TreatFile.aspx?SAFA=2&AMANA=1573;
Mongolia BIT, supra note 55, art. 1; Ethiopia-Israel BIT, supra note 103, art. 1; U.S.Jordan BIT, supra note 170, art. 1.
205. NAFTA, supra note 166, art. 201 (treaty's protections apply to both citizens and
permanent residents).
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"nationality" test to include investors who are permanent
residents. Similarly, the New Israeli Model follows the Old Model
and includes in the definition of "investor" a "natural person who
is a national or permanent resident"2 0 6 of the home state. The New
Model also addresses the problem of dual citizenship and excludes
207
investors who are citizens of both home and host states.
Nevertheless, several Israeli BITs do protect investors who are
also citizens of the host state, allowing these investors to be
considered
citizens of the home state for the purposes of the
208
treaty. In the future, however, Israel may want to treat dual
citizens as citizens of that part 's dominant or effective nationality,
as does the new U.S. model, instead of automatically accepting
the investor's home nationality, which effectively defeats the
purpose of the treaty. By applying the dominant or effective
nationality, Israeli BITs will follow customary international law
standards, which require a case-by-case analysis.2 10
Article 25(2) of the ICSID Convention similarly contains a
jurisdictional requirement based. on nationality. ICSID
jurisdiction, however, is not extended to permanent residents and
dual citizens. 2 11 Thus, while Israeli treaties may meet the
jurisdictional requirements of several investment arbitration
206. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 1; Old Model BIT, supranote 59, art. 1, § 3(a)
("[N]atural persons who are nationals or permanent residents of the Contracting Party
concerned who are not also nationals of the other Contracting Party . . . .").
207. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 1 (treaty covers investors "who [are] not also
a national of the other Contracting Party").
208. See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of Romania and the Government
of the State of Israel for the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 1, §
c, Aug. 3, 1998, available at http://www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il/Financelsrael/Docs/En/
InternationalAgreements/POI/Romaniapoi.pdf.
209. U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 4.
210. These standards were originally adopted by the ICJ's Nottebohm tribunal in the
context of diplomatic protection in international law. Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.),
1955 I.C.J. 4, 22-23 (Apr. 6). Although these standards were questioned, U.N. Int'l Law
Comm., Report of the International Law Commission, 175-76, U.N. Doc. A/57/10 (2002),
they may still be applicable in cases of multiple nationality. CATHERINE YANNACASMALL,

INTERNATIONAL

INVESTMENT

LAW:

UNDERSTANDING

CONCEPTS

AND

TRACKING INNOVATIONS 12 (2008).
211. ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 196 art. 25(2)(a) ("any
natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State other than the State party to
the dispute on the date on which the parties consented to submit such dispute to
conciliation or arbitration as well as on the date on which the request was registered ...
but does not include any person who on either date also had the nationality of the
Contracting State party to the dispute . . . .").
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forums consented to the by the parties, they may not meet the
jurisdiction requirements of an ICSID forum.
Nevertheless, even though the extension of treaty rights to
permanent residents cannot extend ICSID's jurisdiction to such
investors, a review of ICSID arbitration decisions shows a
potential adoption of the "effective212 and dominant citizenship"
standard in a case of dual citizenship, despite the absence of such
standard in the ICSID Convention.
In a global economy investors may possess dual and multiple
nationalities through family and business ties. A total exclusion of
these investors from the protection of ICSID and investment
treaties will reflect inflexibility in an important developing area of
international law. A good, practical solution for multi-national
investors who want to secure jurisdiction in future investment
arbitration disputes is corporate vehicles, which are not subject to
the nationality requirement.
Investors often incorporate local legal entities in the host
state in order to manage and operate their investment. These
entities are usually considered as nationals of the host states
according to their respective national laws. In order to allow such
investors to pursue investment arbitration procedures, however,
investment treaties frequently accord protection to foreigncontrolled legal entities and provide a wide range of tests for
"foreign control" with respect to the "nationality" of the
corporation under consideration."'
The New Israeli Model extended section 3(b) of the Old
Model definition, suggesting a new test for a corporate investor
that covers a corporation "that was incorporated or constituted
under the law" . of the home state, or a corporation "that is
controlled, directly or indirectly, by persons who are nationals or
permanent residents" of the home state. The corporation must
212. See, e.g., Champion Trading Co. v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/02/9,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 288 (Oct. 21, 2003) (suggesting that it may be unreasonable to
consider a party a dual national where, although legally a citizen of his forefathers state,
he has no ties with that country whatsoever).
213. See ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 196, arts. 25-27.
214. For a detailed review of investment treaties' practice on this issue, see U.N.
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Investor-State Dispute Settlement
and Impact on Investment Rulemaking, 12-15, UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/3 (Sept. 2007)
(prepared by Roberto Echandi) [hereinafter UNCTAD (2007)].
215. New Model BIT, supra note 76 art. 1.
216. Id. art. 1, § 5(b)(2).
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also fulfill one of the following conditions: (i) its registered office,
center of management, or practical management is located in'
either home or host state; (ii) a substantial part of its economic
activity is located in the territory of either home or host state; or
(iii) it217was incorporated or constituted under the law of the host
state. This definition provides protection for foreign investors
who hold their investment through a local legal entity, but at the
same time ensures that the corporate vehicle under consideration
has significant links to one of the contracting states. The definition
of corporate nationality will also be important for an ICSID
procedure since the jurisdictional requirements of the ICSID
Convention must be met in addition to the BIT jurisdictional
requirements. The jurisdictional requirements of the ICSID
Convention include (i) an agreement between the parties to the
dispute to treat a legal entity of the host-country as foreign, and
218
(ii) an entity that is effectively controlled by foreigners.
Although the scope of ICSID tribunals' review of the jurisdictional
test for legal entities is unclear, recent cases, such as the Aucoven
case, confirm that any. definition of corporate nationality in an
investment treaty based on a "reasonable criterion" will be
accepted, as long as it is consistent with the purpose of the ICSID
Convention.1 Since the reference to "control" in the New Israeli
Model contains an open-textured language, BITs jurisdiction can
provide some substance to the "control" test, which can be used
for both220Israeli treaties' interpretation and ICSID jurisdiction
analysis.
Home state investors also frequently use a subsidiary in a
third country as a holding company to effectuate their investment
in the host state. 221 This allows investors to take advantage of the
legislation of a third country, usually for tax purposes, and
simultaneously invest in the host state, with which their home
217. Id. art. 1, § 5(b)(2)(i)-(iii).
218. ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 196, art. 25(2)(b).
219. Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Venezuela, 6 ICSID (W. Bank)
419, 501-02 (2001). Consequently, the Aucoven tribunal found direct shareholding as a
mean to participate in the company's decision making and a reasonable test for control.
Id. at 508-13.
220. See UNCTAD (2007), supra note 214, at 12-15 (reviewing recent arbitration cases
which deal with the "foreign control test" for the purposes of investment treaties and
ICSID jurisdiction).
221. Cf Waste Management, Inc. v. Mexico, 43 I.L.M. 967, 983 (2004) (discussing the
definition of investor in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)).
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country has signed an investment treaty. BITs often provide
protection to such investors with respect to an investment in the
host state, and the New Israeli Model, in fact, includes "indirectly"
controlled entities in its definition of "investor."222 Foreign
investors occasionally use this structure to take advantage of a BIT
between the home state and a third country when there is no BIT
223
between the home and host state.
Several recent investor-state arbitration cases have raised the
question of the ability of shareholders in general, and minority
owners in particular, to bring a direct claim against the host state
when the company's rights are deprived.224 The investment law
jurisprudence is consistent-shareholders may bring a direct claim
against the host state for the loss of their proportionate
shareholder value, as long as the "investment" definition in the
BIT is broad enough to express the parties' consent to protect
Since most of BITs do not differentiate
shareholder value.
between majority and minority shareholding, investment
arbitration tribunals have consistently refused to accept the
argument that only majority investors can bring an investment
to their influence on the corporation under
claim due
. .
226.
consideration.
The New Israeli Model, similar to several leading investment
treaty models, offers a broad "investment" definition, which.
includes "rights derived from stocks, shares, bonds, debentures
and other kinds of interests in companies." 2 27 This definition
follows the current jurisprudence, which accepts shareholders'
222. Article 1, Section 5(b)(2) of the New Model, which defines legal entity investor
for the purpose of the scope of the treaty, includes entities "that [are] controlled, directly
or indirectly, by persons who are nationals or permanent residents of the Home
Contracting Party." New Model BIT, supra note 76 art. 1.
223. See Jose E. Alvarez, Empire: ContemporaryForeignInvestment Law: An "Empire
of Law" or the "Law of Empire"?, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 943, 958 (2009).
224. See, e.g., CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) 492, 50809 (2003); GAMI Inv., Inc. v. Mexico, UNCITRAL (Nov. 12, 2004) (Final Award),
reprinted in 44 I.L.M. 545, 550-553 (2005); Enron Corp. v. Argentina, 11 ICSID (W. Bank)
268, 283 (2007).
225. See, e.g., Stanimir A. Alexandrov, The "Baby Boom" of Treaty-BasedArbitrations
and the Jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunals: Shareholders as "Investors" and Jurisdiction
Ratione Temporis, 4 LAW PRAC. INT'L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 19, 40-45 (2005).

226. See, e.g., Lanco Int'l, Inc. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/6, Preliminary
Decision (Dec. 8, 1998), 40 I.L.M. 457, 461, 463 (2001); CMS Gas, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) at
508-09; GAMI, 44 I.L.M. at 550-553; Enron Corp, 11 ICSID (W. Bank) at 283.
227. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 1.
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rights under BITs and ICSID's jurisdiction, and does not
differentiate between majority and minority shareholding for
jurisdictional purposes. Most investment treaties,2 28 including the
New Israel Model, do not require that the shares be held directly
and, in fact, can be held indirectly through intermediate vehicles.
229
in the Israeli model,
The language of "investor" definition
230
following recent ICSID decisions, supports this approach.
However, since the goal of the treaty is to protect economic
activities with close and transparent ties to the contacting states
even in cases of indirect ownership or control, Section 5(b)(2) of
Article 1 of the New Model states several conditions, at least one
of which should be met in order to confirm that the investment is
21,
connected to the contracting parties. It should be noted, though,
that since indirect ownership or control232 could be achieved
through other intermediate companies or persons, including those
of third countries, the treaty's coverage opens the door to
protection of investors using intermediate hostile entities from a
third country. Thus, in addition to permitting a thorough judicial
review by investment arbitration tribunals, the conditions set by
the "investor" definition discussed above are also designed to
protect the security interests of the parties according to the spirit
of the treaty.
The definition of a corporate investor in the New Israeli
not
Model does not address all possible scenarios. It does
233
differentiate between a private and governmental entity, nor
does it differentiate between for-profit and not-for-profit entities.
This lacuna may expose the Israeli government to unnecessary
228. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 166, art. 1117(1).
229. Article 1, Section 5(b)(2) of the New Israeli Model applies the treaty to a
corporation "that is controlled, directly or indirectly, by persons who are nationals or
permanent residents." New Model BIT, supranote 76, art. 1.
230. See, e.g., Gas Natural SDG S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/10, Decision of the Tribunal on Preliminary Questions on Jurisdiction, 21-22
(2005), available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/GasNat.v.Argentina.pdf; CMS Gas, 7 ICSID
(W. Bank) at 508-09.
231. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 1.
232. Although not specifically defined in the treaty, control in this context usually
means ownership of over 50 percent of the voting stock of a company. Many other times,
different arrangements will satisfy the requirement.
233. Other investment treaties do make these distinctions. For instance, the U.S.
Model BIT defines "enterprise" as a legal entity "whethe.r or not for profit, and whether
privately or governmentally owned or controlled . . . ." U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note
27, art 2.
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litigation with political groups or foreign government entities,
especially in the context of intra-governmental security
transactions. Investment arbitration tribunals tend to strictly
BIT and the
interpret the legal form requirement of a 234
jurisdictional provision of the ICSID Convention. Therefore, a
reassessment of the Israeli definition may be appropriate in light
of these circumstances. Finally, the investment treaty's definitions
are inherently connected to other substantive provisions of the
treaty. A-comparison between the U.S. 2004 Model BIT and the
New Israeli Model reveals that only the former includes an
investor who "attempts to make" an investment and not only one
who "is making, or has made an investment in the territory."2 35
This significant distinction is a result of the different approaches to
investment pre-establishment in the treaties.236 The Israeli model
applies investor protection standards to post-establishment only,
while in comparison, the U.S. 2004 Model BIT, which promotes
liberalization of foreign markets, applies investment treaties also
to the pre-establishment phase.237 The U.S. definition of "investor"
is thus adjusted according to the national treatment and mostfavored-nation provisions of the treaty.
To summarize, "investor" and "investment" definitions in
Israeli investment treaties, which provide the scope of the treaty's
coverage, encompass a wide range of economic activities and
investment structures. The definitions are also capable of being
adapted to new and complex investment instruments and
corporate structures as foreign investors become more
sophisticated and take advantage of the global economy. This
article, however, pointed out several lacunas and implications of
Israeli investment treaties, which the Israeli government may
decide to address in future treaties.
234. Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention states the legal personality requirement
to be met for jurisdiction purposes. ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note
196, art. 25(2)(b). See, e.g., Impregilo S.p.A. v. Pakistan, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No.
ARB/03/3, Decision on Jurisdiction, 37 (2005).
235. U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 4. Note that in addition to defining
"investor of a Party," the treaty also defines an "investor of a non-Party" for the purposes
of the treaty. The consequences of an investment by an investor of a non-Party will not be
discussed in this paper in detail due to its minor importance to the discussion.
236. See infra Part VI.C.1.
237. The application of the investors protection standards is not absolute and is subject
to several qualifications and exceptions based on investment treaties' language and
investment arbitration jurisprudence. See infra Part VI.C.1.
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B. Promotion and Protectionof Investment - Absolute Standards
(Fairand Equitable Treatment; Full Protectionand Security)
All Israeli BITs include a preamble that serves as an opening
remark for the treaty." Article 2 of the New Model states its goals
and each of the contracting parties' obligations: to encourage and
protect foreign direct investment in its territory. Whereas the
obligation to protect foreign investment is a legal one with a
minimum standard of treatment that is frequently discussed and
interpreted by the courts, the preamble encouraging foreign
investment is merely a declarative statement, with no clear legal
obligation or standard. In fact, the obligation to protect foreign
investment is perceived as a way to encourage foreign investors to
invest in host states..240
Each party's first obligation in the New Model is to
"encourage and create favorable conditions for investments by
investors of the other Contracting Party and . . . shall admit such

investments." 24 ' This obligation is not absolute and is "subject to its
laws and regulations and subject to its right to exercise the powers
conferred by its laws and regulations." This reservation reflects
the government's ability not only to create favorable conditions for
foreign investment, but also to foster sustainable development by
strengthening the local economy according to local laws and
international commitments. Similar language has served in several
arbitration cases as a general guideline in a treaty interpretation
process seeking to balance investors' protection with long-term
goals of the host state, which may add another substantive layer to
243
the declaratory aspect of the treaty's preamble.
According to the second obligation included in the
introductory provision of the New Model, each contracting party
commits to "fair and equitable treatment" and "full protection and
security" of foreign investors, and each contracting party shall not
"impair by unreasonable measures" any aspect of the
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
right to
§ 1.
243.

Cf MCLACHLAN, supra note 4, at 28-29.
New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 2.
MCLACHLAN, supra note 4, at 28-29.
New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 2.
Id. The previous Israeli model BIT used the following language: "subject to its
exercise the powers conferred by its laws." Old Model BIT, supra note 59, art. 2,
See, e.g., Saluka In vestments, supra note 25, at 42.
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investment. 2 44 FI and ,quitablC ircatmcni and full protection and
security standards are part of substantive investors' rights that are
included in the vast majority of investment treaties, and virtually
all BITs. 245 Unlike national treatment and MFN standards, these
standards are absolute and provide a certain level of protection
regardless of the level of protection iven to the host state's own
nationals or nationals of other states.
The fair and equitable standard is subject to an ongoing
debate about whether it is equivalent to the international
minimum standard of treatment under customary international
law, or if it is an independent standard that can be interpreted
separately. 24 Although this standard is interpreted on a case-bycase basis, it is generally perceived as a rule of law applicable to all
branches of domestic government, including the national
248
legislature, domestic administration, and domestic courts.
Consequently, the fair and equitable standard can include, among
other obligations, the protection of an investor's legitimate
expectations, procedural due process and denial of justice,
predictability of the legal system, protection against discrimination
and
arbitrariness,
and
commitment
to
transparency,
reasonableness and proportionality.249 Although most of these
principles are well integrated into the Israeli legal system, the
potential impact of the fair and equitable treatment standard on
the domestic government can be significant and should not be
250
ignored.

244. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 2.
245. McLACHLAN, supra note 4, at 30.
246. Stephan W. Schill, Tearing Down the Great Wall: The New Generation Investment
Treaties of the People's Republic of China, 15 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 73, 103
(2007) [hereinafter Tearing Down the Great Wall].
247. For instance, the FTC analyzed Article 1105 of NAFTA, which provides investors
treatment according to minimum standard in international law, and concluded that this
provision refers to customary international law, which includes fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security. FREE TRADE COMM'N, NOTES OF
INTERPRETATION OF CERTAIN CHAPTER 11 PROVISIONS (2001).
248. Stephan W. Schill, Fairand Equitable Treatment Under Investment Treaties as an
Embodiment of the Rule of Law 23 (Inst. for Int'l Law and Justice, Working Paper No.
2006/6, 2006), available at http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2006-6-GAL-Schillweb.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
249. Id. at 11-23.
250. A similar argument was raised by Stephan Schill in the context of the Chinese
legal system. Tearing Down the Great Wall, supra note 246, at 103-06.
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The full protection and security obligation, which is tied to
the fair and equitable standard, provides the guarantee of full
protection by granting police protection against physical
interferences by private actors. 2 51 Although cases involving the full
protection and security obligation tend to be less common in
recent times, early investment arbitration claims raised this
obligation in 252
the context of destruction of real estate by local
armed forces. The full protection and security standard, for
example, may raise the level of protection required from Israeli
authorities to secure foreign investments in Israel against local
terrorism. 253
To conclude, investor-state arbitration jurisprudence has
developed the meaning and place of "fair and equitable
treatment" and "full protection and security" standards in
protection of foreign investors. Israel, which adopted this exact
evolutionary standard in both its Old and New Models without
providing its content, will have to adjust texts of future treaties to
the existing and developing concepts of these obligations in
international investment law.
C. The Contingent Principles: Most FavoredNation and National
Treatment
The national treatment and most favored nation ("MFN")
principles, usually described as "contingent standards" 2 , of any
BIT,- have become an integral part of the investment protection
treatment in customary international law and investment treaties
256
practice. Although familiar to us from international trade law,
these rights have been subject to increasing litigation and to an
independent interpretation process in international investment
arbitration.2 57 Since the bilateral process of investment treaties
does not usually provide informative guidance on the public record
with regard to the intention of the parties, arbitral tribunals find it
difficult to unveil the content behind the "open-textured
251. MCLACHLAN, supra note 4, at 247.

2-52.
253.
254.
Group,
255.
256.
257.

See, e.g., Am. Mfg. & Trading Inc. v. Zaire, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 11, 11 (1997).
See MCLACHLAN, supra note 4, at 247-248.
See, e.g., Mondev Int'l, Ltd. v. U.S., 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 181, 215, 222 (2002); ADF
Inc. v. U.S., 6 ICSID (W. Bank) 449, 529-30 (2004).
MCLACHLAN, supra note 4, at 210-11.
See id. at 254.
See id. at 201.
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language" of the treaties.258 It should be noted that although this
article carefully analyzes the bilateral process based on
governmental documents and interviews with government officials,
these sources are not part of the public record.
According to the national treatment principle, as described in
Article 3, Section 1 of the New Israeli Model, parties to the treaty
cannot "subject investments or returns of investments . . . to

treatment less favorable than that which it accords to investments
or returns of investments of its own investors."25 9 The MFN
principle similarly requires that the parties cannot subject
investments or returns of investments "to treatment less favorable
than that which it accords to investment or returns of investment
of an investor of any third state."26 0 The national treatment and
MFN standards together provide prospective investors with a level
playing field in the international investments marketplace. 2 61 This
section will explore these important standards in Israeli treaties indepth from a comparative perspective.
1. Pre-Establishment Admission and National Regulation of FDI
Even though different model BITs share similar standards
regarding the national treatment protection, a major policy
difference exists between states that limit the protection to postestablishment operation and states that extend the protection to
pre-establishment as well. 2 62 Since one of the goals263of investment
treaties is to facilitate access to foreign investment, the question
whether an investment treaty extends the right of establishment is
crucial. A treaty's language will explicitly state its policy on the
issue.264 A close review of current trends in investment treaties
shows three types of investment treaties: American (followed by
other Western states), European, and South-South agreements
258. Id. at 202.
259. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 3 (emphasis added).
260. Id. (emphasis added).
261. MCLACHLAN, supra note 4, at 210-11 (explaining that these standards "are
usually described as 'contingent standards' in that the quality of treatment which they
prescribe in determined by reference to that accorded to others in the same position.")
262. Id. at 211.
263. Most BITs include a provision that specifies the promotion of foreign investment
in the host state as one of the goals of the treaty. For example, the New Israeli Model asks
the parties to "encourage and create favorable conditions for investments by investors...
New Model BIT, supranote 76, art. 3.
264. See MCLACHLAN supra note 4, at 211.
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between two developing countries.265 The status of preestablishment of FDI is one of the key differentiators between the
U.S. and the European models.2 6
Various investment treaty models show mixed attitudes
towards pre-establishment foreign investments.26 While the U.S.
model refers to "the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
and sale or other disposition of
management, conduct, operation,
268
investments in its territory," with regards to national treatment
does not extend this
and MFN standards, the U.K. model
269
Looking at multilateral
protection to the pre-entry phase.
investment agreements signed by states with traditional conflicting
interests and developing investment jurisprudence, NAIFTA
and MFN protections to the preextends national treatment
270
establishment phase.
The Energy Charter Treaty ("ECT") extends the protection
of the national treatment standard to the making of an investment
only by negotiation of an unconcluded subsequent treaty.
Meanwhile, all exceptions should be notified to the principal of the
271
ECT Secretariat.
The New Israeli Model extends the application of the
contingent standards to "managementi12 maintenance, use,
enjoyment or disposal" of the investment, which suggests that
the Israeli model follows the U.K. model's approach in protecting
investors only in the post-establishment phase. The Israeli
government's policy can be explained by its desire to preserve its
265. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development [UNCTAD], UNCTAD Series on
International Investment Policies for Development, South-South Cooperation in
International Investment Arrangements, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/3 (2005)
[hereinafter South-South Cooperation].
266. MCLACHLAN supra note 4, at 211.
267. See id. at 211-12.
268. U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 6 (emphasis added).
269. Article 2(1) of the U.K. Model BIT states that the obligation upon the host state
to admit capital is made "subject to its right to exercise powers conferred by its laws",
which practically prevents any expansion of the national treatment standard to the preestablishment phase. See RUDOLF DOLZER AND CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 376 (2008) [hereinafter U.K. Model BIT].

270. NAFTA, supra note 166, arts. 1102-03 (granting rights to foreign investors in the
"establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other
disposition of investments"). Article 1104 also provides that the investor is entitled to "the
better of the treatment required by Articles 1102 and 1103." Id. art. 1104.
271. Energy Charter Treaty art. 10 § 8, Dec. 17, 1994,2080 U.N.T.S. 95.
272. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 3.
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ability to determine the conditions under which it will admit
foreign investment, while keeping a preferred treatment to local
investors. From a historical perspective, it can be argued that
because Israel signed its first investment treaty with Western
European country,2 and Israel's legal system is based on the
English common law,274 the European model has had a significant
influence on the development of the Israeli model.
The question of the applicability of certain standards to the
pre-establishment phase is part of a broader discussion about the
275
role of investment liberalization in bilateral investment treaties.
The national treatment and MFN principles enhance free
admission of FDI but at the same time they directly limit the
power of national. legislation, which affects states' ability to
276
regulate local industries. States relinquish some flexibility to
limit the exposure of certain local industries to global competition
in order to develop and protect infant industries or national
277
champions based on local economic needs and political pressure.
The tension between the competitive global market for foreign
investments and local, national development concerns shapes the
FDI legal framework.
A broad legislation in Israel, through general laws and
industry-specific regulations, imposes significant discriminating
limitations on the way foreign investors can invest or operate in,
among other fields, the real estate market, defense companies,
state-owned companies, companies that provide "necessary"
278
services, or services with strong security or national aspects.
Proposed regulations concerning security and defense companies
in Israel are subject to a complex process with a thorough review
mechanism programmed to balance security interests with the
needs of a market economy. 1 Nevertheless, certain desirable
273. Treaty Between the State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, June 24, 1976,
http://www.mfa.gov.illmfa/usercontrols/
at
available
TreatFile.aspx?SAFA=2&AMANA=774.
274. Guy Mundlak, The Israeli System of Labor Law: Sources and Form, 30 Comp.
Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 159, 159 (2009).
275. See Salacuse & Sullivan, supra note 97, at 76.
276. See id. at 70-71, 77.
277. See id. at 77.
278. U.S. Department of State 2009 Investment Climate Statement - Israel,
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rlsothr/ics/2009/117445.htm.

279. Id.
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investments may be blocked by a protective legislation driven by a
pro-security government. The same argument can be made with
respect to other discriminatory measures. The lack of transparent
admission policy in Israel may therefore hurt its credibility and
potentially reduce foreign investment inflows in the future.28 An
investment treaty can serve as the right instrument to solve this
problem by slowly shifting from an investment-control-model to a
negative-list-model, which provides for a limited list of
exceptions. 2 81 Nevertheless, Israel may continue to reduce the
number of pro-admission legal instruments. Its new OECD
membership will limit its ability to do so due to its commitment to
the various OECD pro-admission instruments.
Once a foreign investment is established in the host state,
either through a free admission policy or as a result of lax
screening policies, it enjoys the protection of the national
treatment and MFN obligations of the treaty. Correspondingly,
this article will now discuss each one of these standards to evaluate
the level of protection they accord, especially in the Israeli context.
2. National Treatment
The national treatment obligation was discussed in several
leading NAFTA investment cases and BIT procedures. with
inconsistent results.282 Nevertheless, the majority of the
jurisprudence regarding the NAFTA "no less favorable" national
28
concludes that foreign investors should get a
treatment standardm
treatment equivalent to the best treatment accorded to domestic
investors without a need to show disproportionate disadvantage to
280. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE 145 (1999)
(observing
that
the
international investment community
"values
stability,
predictability, transparency and the ability to transfer and protect its private property
from arbitrary or criminal confiscation").
281. See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], International Investment
Perspectives 176 (2006), available at http://browse.oecdbookshop.org/oecd/pdfs/
browseit/2006061E.PDF (noting that the use of.a negative list approach facilitates broader
coverage, progressiveness and transparency).
282. See generally Jurgen Kurtz, The Use And Abuse Of WTO Law In Investor--State
Arbitration: Competition And Its Discontents, 20 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 749, 759-69 (2009)
(exploring the history of substantive analysis by an investor-state arbitral tribunal of the
national treatment obligation). See also Response to 'The Use and Abuse of WTO Law in
Investor-State Arbitration, Robert Howse and Efraim Chalamish, European Journal of
International Law, Nov 01, 2009; 20:1087-1094.
283. NAFTA, supra note 166, art. 1102.
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the foreign investor.2 8 The Israeli New Model, which uses the
285
same "no less favorable" expression, should be interpreted in the
same manner.
In order to evaluate the host country's treatment of a foreign
investor, investment arbitral tribunals compare the treatment of
the prospecting foreign investor and the most directly comparable
local. investor or investors in the same business or economic
sector,286 even when only one investor is in the same business
If indeed a different treatment exists, the tribunal
sector.
examines whether the different treatment has "a reasonable nexus
to rational government policies that (1) do not distinguish, on their
face or de facto, between foreign-owned and domestic companies,
and (2) do not otherwise unduly undermine the investment
liberalizing objectives" of the treaty. 288 "At least one case has
found an export ban with a protectionist motive did not impact the
,289
comparison analysis."
The contingent standards in the U.S. 2004 Model BIT,
following other typical models, require that equal treatment will
be accorded to foreign investors "in like circumstances."29 0
Borrowed from international trade law, this expression was
interpreted by investment arbitral tribunals to include the test
mentioned above.21 The Methanex Corp. v. United States tribunal,
however, which discussed the ban imposed in California on the use
of Methanol in the reformulated gasoline market, did not import
the term "any like, directly competitive or substitutable goods"
from the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade ("GATT") into
284. See, e.g., Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) 43, 110, 118 (2001)
(assessing the discriminatory softwood lumber regime and finding a breach of Article 1102
of NAFTA, the national treatment provision).
285. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 3.
286. But see Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co. v. Ecuador, LCIA Case No. UN
3467 (July 1, 2004) (Final Award), reprinted in 12 ICSID (W. Bank) 54, 92 (2005)
(rejecting the comparison with the applicable sector exclusively).
287. See Feldman v. Mexico, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) 318, 388-97 (2005).
288. Pope & Talbot, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) at 120.
289. S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, $I 254-55 (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2000)
(Partial Award) available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/myersvcanadapartialaward final_13-11-00.pdf.
290. U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 6-7 (emphasis added).
291. See e.g., United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Canada, 1 87-120, Award of
May 24, 2007 available at http://www.international.gc.caltrade-agreements-accordscommerciaux/assets/pdfs/MeritsAward24May2007.pdf (analyzing the different features of
the Canadian postal services to be compared with UPS' services in Canada).
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292

the meaning of "in like circumstances" in investment treaties.
The tribunal cited the limited scope of the text and the fact that
to the GATT when applicable as
NAFTA refers specifically
..
293
support for its decision.
The Israeli New Model does not include the expression "in
like circumstances" in the contingent standards article but refers
generally to "treatment less favorable." 294 It is unclear whether it
is a lacuna or whether the draft treaty, in fact, does not intend to
follow the majority view in investment arbitration jurisprudence
and investment treaties drafting practice. In order to avoid
ambiguity in the future, future Israeli negotiators may want to
consider including a more detailed version of the text of the test to
be applied in the national treatment obligation.
The implication of the national treatment principle in the
Israeli context is challenging in light of the transition from a
government-based economy to a market-based economy. For
several decades Israel adopted discriminatory legislation measures
that protected local investors by eliminating any competition with
foreign players. The new market-based economy, which begun in
the 1980s and gained power during the 1990s, forced the Israeli
government to instate a new competitive legislation that treated
foreign investors as it treats local ones.295 In fact, foreign investors
frequently receive a better treatment in Israel than Israeli
nationals as part of the governmental scheme to grant them
incentives and boost foreign investment into the country.296 This
new reality questions the importance of the national treatment
obligation, particularly since formal, discriminatory practices in
courts and other administrative procedures are still rare.
Nevertheless, implementing this obligation will abolish existing
practices with respect to state-owned corporations and prevent
adoption of new privileges for local investors while discriminating
292. Methanex Corp. v. United States, 44 I.L.M. 1345, 1449 (2005).
293. Id.
294. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 3.
295. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD INVESTMENT POLICY

REVIEWS: ISRAEL 7 (2002).
296. E.g., State of Israel Ministry of Industry, Trade, & Labor, Investment Incentives
Investment,
Capital
of
Encouragement
the
Law
for
the
in
http://www.investinisrael.gov.il/NR/exeres/08348DA2-83D3-47B1-BO43ED418D9AA846.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2010) (Foreign investors enjoy greater tax
benefits over their domestic counterparts).
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against foreign investors. Consequently, foreign investors will be
able to enjoy the privileges granted to them and at the same time
pick from various local regulations that are accessible to them as a
result of implementing the national treatment standard.
Israel's integration into the OECD, first as a non-OECD
member and most recently as a new member, was the most
significant step towards full participation in the global economy as
an open and competitive market in recent years. Israel took an
important step towards joining the OECD community when it
signed the OECD Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises, which calls for no less favorable
297
treatment of foreign investors than domestic enterprises. Israel
joined the declaration following a careful OECD investment
policy review, one of the most comprehensive reviews of Israel
investment policy ever made.298 Being associated with the
declaration has the likelihood of reinforcing the Israeli
government's efforts to pursue investment-friendly economic
reforms.
The declaration also promotes voluntary standards of
business conduct through the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises.29 Adherence to the declaration will enable Israel to
share experiences on business conduct with OECD members and
other non-OECD signatories. According to the declaration, Israel
has the obligation to notify its exceptions to, and other measures
taken under, the national treatment obligation for transparency
reasons. 300 Israel's traditional investment policy has blocked
several sectors for foreign investment or imposed significant
barriers on potential foreign investors and, indeed, these
exceptions were communicated to the OECD."'
297. Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], The OECD Declaration and
Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises: Basis Texts, at 6,
at
available
9,
2000),
(Nov.
DAFFE/IME(2000)20
Doc.
OECD
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2000doc.nsf/4f7adc214b91a685cl2569fa005d0ee7/cl25692700
[hereinafter OECD Declaration and
623b74cl256991003b5147/$FILE/00085743.pdf
Decisions].
298. OECD INVESTMENT POLICY REVIEWS: ISRAEL, supra note 295.

299. OECD Declaration and Decisions, supra note 297, at 5; Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2008),
availableat http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
300. OECD Declarationand Decisions, supra note 297, at 30.
301. ORG. FOR ECON. Co-OPERATION AND DEV., NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR
FOR
REPORTED
LIST OF MEASURES
ENTERPRISES:
FOREIGN-CONTROLLED
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As a result of the Israeli government's efforts to pursue
investment-friendly economic reforms, as well as international
pressure led by international organizations such as the
International Monetary Fund and the OECD, many of these
policies are currently under review or have already been subject to
a substantial reform.3 02 For instance, Ehud Olmert, then Minister
of Industry, Trade and Labor, established on May 2, 2004, an
administrative committee known as the Gadish committee after its
head, Yaakov Gadish. The committee's goal was to explore the
feasibility of several reforms in the Isiael Lands Administration
("ILA"). One of the ILA's functions to be reviewed was its
predominant role in land purchase approval process. On June 19,
2005, the Israeli government approved the recommendations of
the Gadish Committee.30 3
3. Most Favored Nation (MFN)
Like national treatment, the MFN treatment has been subject
tribunals and the
to an extensive review by international
304
International Law Commission. This standard affords foreign
investors in a host state the same treatment as required under
305
specific BIT provisions between the host state and third parties.
Like most investment treaty models, the Israeli model
combines the MFN standard with the national treatment standard
into one provision using similar language.306 Hence, the previous
discussion regarding the interpretation of terms such as "less
favorable than" or "in like circumstances" is also applicable in the
context of the MFN obligation.
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
available at
(2009),
45-47
57/46/38273182.pdf.
302. See OECD INVESTMENT POLICY REVIEWS: ISRAEL, supra note 295, at 13.
303. Press Release, Adalah The Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, Adalah
to Israeli Government: Proposed Exchange of Land Between the State and JNF will
Exacerbate Discrimination against Arab Citizens of Israel and Violate their Basic Rights
at
http://www.adalah.org/eng/pressreleases/
available
2005),
28,
(June
pr.phpfile=05_06_28-1.
304. See, e.g., Summary Records of the 30th Session, Draft Articles on the MostFavoured-NationClauses, [1978] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 40.
305. See, e.g., MTD Equity Sdn Bhd v. Chile, 12 ICSID (W. Bank) 3, 20-21 (2007)
(finding that provisions of Croatia-Chile and Denmark-Chile BITs were applicable to the
BIT between MTD, a Malaysian investor, and Chile by operation of the MFN clause in
that latter BIT).
306. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 3.
TRANSPARENCY

2010]

An Oasis in the Desert

185

A significant part of the MFN jurisprudence, however, is tied
to the substantive discussion about the scope of the MFN
principle. Unlike the national treatment principle, MFN requires a
careful review of treaties between third parties, including certain
provisions that have been negotiated by these parties. Therefore,
the applicability of these provisions to other parties through the
MFN clause calls for diligent consideration. Moreover, it is not
clear whether arbitral tribunals can apply the MFN clause to the
procedural rights of the BIT, or more specifically, to dispute
settlement provisions. This is especially unclear due to their
bilateral nature, inability to compare treaties and evaluate
preferential treatment with respect to legal procedures, and the
potential chaos that could be created by applying multiple dispute
settlement provisions of several investment treaties in one setting.
Yet, since the dispute settlement mechanism makes the BIT's
substantive rights enforceable, the correlation between the
substantive and procedural rights builds the case for application of
the MIFN principle to procedural rights.
A careful review of investment arbitration jurisprudence
reveals conflicting conclusions on the question of the application
of the MFN standard to procedurial rights. The leading case is
Maffezini v. Spain 08 which was based on the Argentina-Spain
to the dispute
BIT. 309 There the tribunal applied the MFN clause
310
settlement provisions of the Chile-Spain BIT, whihc did not
require recourse to local courts before bringing an ICSID claim.
This resulted in a shorter waiting period before -applying
Although several legal
international investment arbitration.
scholars heavily criticized this decision,312 it has been 313followed by
other arbitration cases, such as Siemens v. Argentina, Tecmed v.
Mexico,3 14 and Suez v. Argentina.3 " The leading argument behind
307. See MCLACHLAN, supra note 4, at 254.
308. Maffezini v. Spain, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 387 (2002).
309. Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, SpainArg., Oct. 3, 1991, 1699 U.N.T.S. 202.
310. Agreement on the Reciprocal Protection and Promotion of Investments, SpainChile, Oct. 2, 1991, 1774 U.N.T.S. 15.
311. Maffezini, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) at 404-11.
312. Stephan W. Schill, MultilateralInvestment Treaties Through Most-Favored-Nation
Clauses, 27 Berkley J. Int'l L. 496, 537 (2009). .
313. Siemens AG v. Argentine Republic, 12 ICSID (W. Bank) 171, 207-08 (2007).
314. Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, 10 ICSID
(W. Bank) 130, 153 (2003).
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these decisions was that the procedural provisions in investment
treaties are inherently connected to the substantive provisions and
have an impact on the use of these rights.
Several investment arbitration decisions and draft treaties,
however, have disagreed with that approach. For instance, the
Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (or
CAFTA) explicitly excludes dispute 316settlement provisions 317from
being covered by the MFN provision. The Salini v. Jordan and
Plama v. Bulgaria31 decisions have also rejected the Maffezini
tribunal's rationale. The Plama tribunal concluded that any
application of the MFN provision to dispute settlement provisions
can undermine the harmonization process of dispute settlement
provisions and that public policy exceptions do not actually
support the rationale behind the rule as interpreted by the
Maffezini tribunal. As a result, it concluded, the MFN provision
should not apply to dispute settlement provisions unless the parties
have explicitly agreed to do so in advance."'
The Old and New Israeli Models ignore the question and do
not refer specifically to procedural provisions in the context of the
MFN standard.3 20 Historical research does not reveal any public
records or judicial decisions that interpret the Israeli MFN
provision. Since new generation Israeli investment treaties provide
a broader range of substantive and procedural rights than the
older generation, one can claim that the parties to an old treaty
can use the MFN provision to apply provisions of new treaties with
broader protections. Future investment treaties should reflect the
Israeli government's view on this topic, although such a view has
315. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Interagua Servicios
Integrales de Agua S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB/03/17,
Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 52-66 (May 16, 2006).
316. See e.g., Draft of the Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement art.
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/
2004,
Jan. 28,
10.4,
§ 2 n.1,
USACAFTA/Jan28draft/chapl0_e.pdf (stating that the parties agree that the MFN
clause they include in their treaty "does not encompass international dispute resolution
mechanisms such as those contained in Section C of this Chapter, and therefore could not
reasonably lead to a conclusion similar to that of the Maffezini case").
317. Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 44 I.L.M. 573, 592
(2005).
318. Plama Consortium Ltd. v. Bulgaria, 20 ICSID (W. Bank) Rev-FILJ 262, 330-33
(2005).
319. Id.
320. See Old Model BIT, supra note 59, art. 3; New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 3.
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not been adopted yet. The United Kingdom, for example, chose to
include a reference to dispute settlement provisions in the MFN
provision with its draft model."'
4. Exceptions and Limitations to the Standards
The New Model tries to limit the impact of the MFN and
national treatment principles in a way that the treaty "shall not
preclude a differential in the laws or regulations of a Contracting
Party or in the exercising of. the powers conferred by those laws
and regulations, regarding rights or privileges granted to its own
investors, or to investments or returns of investments of its own
investors."32 This reflects the ongoing efforts to balance between
international commitments and national protectionism to ensure
sustainable development.
This reservation, however, does not aply to some basic rights
granted to foreign investors in the treaty. Article 7 of the New
Model lists several privileges that are excluded from the protection
of the contingent standards since they are based on bilateral or
324
multilateral commitments. Rights or privileges granted to Israeli
investors, which are allowed according to the New Model, remain
open-textured and are subject to future arbitral interpretation and
potential limitation. A similar arrangement exists in the NAFTA
treaty, where Article 1108 excludes state procurement from the
and enables parties to
investments covered by these standards
326
schedule non-conforming measures.
The above-discussed reservation conforms with existing
Israeli laws that grant privileges to Israeli nationals. Israel
officially discriminates between local factories or entrepreneurs
and foreign corporations by giving local corporations special
research and development ("R&D") grants. The Israeli
government's policy of encouraging and supporting industrial
321. U.K. Model BIT, supra note 269, art. 3(3).
322. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 4.
323. Id. ("[N[either Contracting Party shall derogate from the provisions set forth in
Articles 4 to 6 of this Agreement."). Articles 4 through 6 deal with compensation for
losses, expropriation, and repatriation of investments and returns.
324. Id. at 7 (excluding benefits resulting from international tax agreements or
domestic tax legislation, free trade agreements, international intellectual property
agreements and Israeli BITs that were signed before July 1, 2003).
325. NAFTA, supra note 166, art. 1108(7).
326. Id. art. 1108(1)-(2).
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R&D in Israel has been implemented by the Office of327the Chief
Scientist of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor through
the Encouragement of Industrial Research and Development Law
5744-1984. One of its main programs, the R&D Fund, supports
R&D projects of Israeli corporations by offering conditional
grants ranging between 20 to 50 percent of the approved R&D
proposal 32 while the Israeli government shares in any commercial
success. These grants are not available to foreign investors who
do not invest through an Israeli corporation.
With respect to government tenders, the Israeli government
also grants certain benefits to local businesses that are not
available to foreign bidders. The Mandatory Tenders Regulations
prefer the use of Israeli products to imported products, provided
that the price of the given Israeli product does not exceed that of
the imported product by more than. 15 percent. The effect of this
legislation is slightly reduced by the bilateral Government
Procurement Agreement, which allows European Community
being obligated by the
companies to win local tenders without
332
Investment incentives and
Mandatory Tenders Regulations.
conditions are some of the main legislative instruments used to
design investment allocation among multiple jurisdictions. The
grants and preferences discussed above, which aim to develop
know-how locally and promote national interests, have a
significant impact on the way foreign investors perceive admission

327. State of Israel, Ministry of Industry, Trade & Labor, Office of the Chief Scientist,
Support for Industrial R & D, availableat http://www.moital.gov.il/NR/exeres/625D5CO89096-4B88-BAEF-09E7CCOE19A9.htm (last visited on Nov. 10, 2009) (expressing the
Chief Scientist's support of research and development programs, which operate on an
annual budget of U.S. $300 million).
328. State of Israel Ministry of Industry, Trade, & Labor, The Encouragement of
Industrial Research and Development Law, 5744-1984, http://www.moital.gov.il/
NR/exeres/9F263279-B1F7-4E42-828A-4B84160F7684.HTM (lasted visited Jan. 28, 2010).
329. Id. § 28(a).
330. Id. § 21(a) (requiring the grantee to repay the grant by royalty payments in case
of commercial success).
331. Mandatory Tenders Regulations (Preference for Israel Products and Mandatory
Business Cooperation), 1995, Kovetz Ha-Takkanot 5755, 562, § 3(a) (Isr.); see also id. § 1
(defining "goods made in Israel" as "goods made in Israel or made in an area by a
producer who is an Israel citizen, or a permanent resident of Israel, or a corporate entity
registered in Israel, on condition that the price of their Israel content constitutes at least
35% of the proposed price").
332. Council Decision 97/474, art. 2, 1997 O.J. (L202) 72, 86 (EC).
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of FDI in the Israeli market. That is, any preferences given to
nationals limit de facto FDI inflows.
Another common exception in investment treaties allows host
states to adopt measures necessary to protect security interests.
Article 7, Section 1 of the New Israeli Model provides for a
security exception and states: 'Either Contracting Party may take
measures strictly necessary for the maintenance or protection of its
essential security interests. Such measures shall be taken and
implemented in good faith, in a non-discriminatory fashion and so
as to minimize the deviation from the provisions of this
Agreement.'
This broadly drafted exception allows the Israeli government
to avoid treaty commitments, such as MFN and national treatment
standards, in order to maintain or protect "essential security
interests" that are frequently hard to define. As can be found in
other areas of Israeli law, the legal principles of investment
treaties can easily be limited by a continuous war or a terrorism
consideration. It should be noted, however, that the language of
Article 7, section 1, represents a compromise, because several
Israeli government entities had expressed their concerns during
the review of the Old Model about the potential risks of a very
broad security exception."'
The provision, as a result, includes necessity, proportionality,
and non-discrimination requirements in order for the exception to
operate. These constraints are, in fact, being used
frequently in
336
judicial review of constitutional rights in Israel. Interestingly
enough, although Israel's security interests are more significant
and imminent than those of many other states, several other
leading models of investment treaties, such as the U.S. 2004 Model

333. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 7.
334. Eyal Benvenisti, The Implications of Considerations of Security and ForeignRelations on the Applications of Treaties in Israeli Law, 21 MISHPATIM 221 (1992).
335. See Interview with Zvia Gross, former Gen. Counsel, Ministry of Defense, in
D.C., U.S. (Mar. 24, 2007) (while the Ministry of Defense consistently acts to adjust
financial regulation to security concerns, both the Ministry of Finance and Foreign
Ministry promote constructive foreign relationsand foreign direct investment).
336. See generally Yoav Dotan, Judicial Rhetoric, Government Lawyers, and Human
Rights: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice During the Intifada, 33 LAW & SOC'Y
REv. 319, 346-47 (1999) (examining the case of judicial review of minority rights by the
Israeli High Court of Justice during periods of emergency or confrontation).
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BIT, contain much more lax limitations on the use of the "security
interests" exception.3 3 1
D. Expropriation
A key principle of the BIT is that a host state can expropriate
a foreign investment only according to customary international
law. This important BIT obligation is subject to extensive litigation
in investment arbitration cases. Article 5, Section 1, of the New
338
Model mirrors the customary international law standard,
according to which expropriation, nationalization, or any other
"measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or
expropriation" have to be (1) for public purpose related to the
internal needs of the country; (2) on a non-discriminatory basis*
and (3) against prompt, adequate and effective compensation.
The U.S. 2004 Model BIT adds another important layer, requiring
expropriation to be in accordance with due process of law and a
minimum standard of treatment as specified in the treaty.34 0 The
Israeli model, which formally lacks this requirement, provides that
"investors affected shall have a right, under the law of the
Contracting Party making the expropriation, to prompt review, by
a judicial or other independent authority of that Contracting Party,
of the legality of the expropriation and of the valuation of their
investment." A comparison between the Israeli and U.S. models,
however, shows that a judicial review fulfills the due process
requirement, and meeting the minimum standard of treatment
should be part of that review process according to customary
international law.
337. See, e.g., U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 19 (referring only to the
"necessity" element in its essential security exception).
338. The New Model did not significantly change the language of the "expropriation"
provision of the Old Model. The only change is the deletion of a reference to
compensation in "freely convertible currency."
339. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 6. The phrase "prompt, adequate, and
effective compensation," known as the Hull Formula in public international law, was used
by United States Secretary of State Cordell Hull in 1938 in his notes to the Mexican
Government claiming compensation for expropriated agrarian lands owned by U.S.
nationals in Mexico. The Hull Formula as a customary international law standard for
compensation has been subject to an extensive debate. See generally ANDREAS F.
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw 397-403 (2002) (reviewing the history of
the Hull formula).
340.
341.

U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 8.
New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 5.
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Israeli investment treaties do not make a distinction between
direct and indirect expropriation and prefer to use the general
term "measures having effect equivalent to nationalization or
expropriation." 34 2 Nationalization or expropriation can impact the
substance or value of the property or void the investor's control of
it. The distinction between direct and indirect expropriation has
significant implications in investment arbitration cases.
Historically, early arbitration cases dealt with direct expropriation,
where host states had deprived foreign investors of the legal rights
of ownership to their property.343 The parties in these cases usually
agreed that a direct taking had occurred, but the tribunals faced
questions regarding what rights to property were capable of being
the object of a compensable taking, and what the proper standard
of compensation was for the deprived investment.
Modern cases, on the other hand, focus on indirect
expropriations in the regulatory context and offer a thorough
discussion on whether the economic impact of a regulatory action
on the investment is considered "taking" and whether this taking is
a violation of the expropriation standard in applicable bilateral or
multilateral treaties or customary international law. 4 ' Among
include a municipal authority's permit
these actions
346
34
requirement, termination of a tax rebate regime, and a new
regulation prohibitin the export of hazardous materials to a
neighboring country.
The Israeli model lacks explanatory notes and does not
provide any content or guidelines to the term "expropriation" in

342. Id. at 5.
343. Jan Paulsson & Zachary Douglas, Indirect Expropriation in Investment Treaty
Arbitrations, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS 145, 151 (Norbert Horn & Stefan Kroll eds., 2004). An
example of a rare direct expropriation case in recent years is the Middle East Cement
Shipping & Handling case, where the Ministry of Construction in Egypt issued a decree
that effectively revoked the rights under a license for importation and storage of bulk
cement at a Suez port. Middle East Cement Shipping & Handling Co. v. Egypt, 7 ICSID
(W. Bank) 173, 189 (2005)
344. Paulsson & Douglas, supra note 343, at 151.
345. Id. at 151-157.
346. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 209 (2002).
347. Feldman v. Mexico, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) 318 (2005).
348. S.D. Myers Inc. v. Canada, (NAFTA/UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. 2000) (Partial
at
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accordsAward)
available
commerciaux/assets/pdfs/myersvcanadapartialaward final_13-11-00.pdf.
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the treaty.34 9 It therefore leaves it to investment arbitrators to
analyze each investment according to the "expropriation"
jurisprudence in international investment arbitration. This
jurisprudence is complex and inconsistent, and could potentially
create a situation of conflicting decisions among investment
arbitral tribunals, especially in the indirect expropriation
context.5 Several other models offer more concrete guidelines
that can be used when interpreting an Israeli investment treaty,
since many provisions in investment treaties are gradually meeting
the legal requirements for being part of customary international
law.35 1
The U.S. 2004 Model BIT, for instance, includes explanatory
notes that differentiate between direct and indirect expropriation,
although both are covered as long as they interfere with a tangible
or intangible property right or interest in an investment.
According to these notes, direct expropriation is made through a
formal transfer of title or outright seizure, while indirect
expropriation is an action or a series of actions with an equivalent
13
effect but without a formal transfer of title or outright seizure.
An indirect expropriation, per these guidelines, will be
examined on a case-by-case basis. Some of the factors that should
be taken into account are: (i) the economic impact of a
government action (not on a standalone basis); (ii) the extent to
which a government action interferes with distinct, reasonable
investment-backed expectations; and (iii) the character of the
government action.35 4 This formula provides a broad range of
relevant factors and avoids a previously proposed and highly
criticized general "test" for indirect expropriation, which tries to

349. See New Model BIT, supra note 76.
350.

See

ROBERT

MELTZ,

CONGRESSIONAL

RESEARCH

SERVICE,

FOREIGN

INVESTOR PROTECTION UNDER NAFTA CHAPTER 11, at 13-14 (2003).
351. See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Investment Agreements and International
Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 123 (2003) (arguing that the mass of almost identical
bilateral investment treaties constitutes international legislation). This author supports
Lowenfeld's view on this issue. Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment
Treaties:A De Facto MultilateralAgreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 303, 314-345 (2009).
352. U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 38.
353. Id.
354. Id.
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take into account multiple decisions of international tribunals and
is impractical in a particular set of circumstances."'
A careful review of recent arbitration cases strongly
emphasizes investors' frustration when their legitimate
expectations, based on a reasonable reliance upon representations
and undertakings by the host state, are not met. The element of
economic impact by the host state on the investment cannot be a
conclusive factor in an indirect expropriation decision, but will
support a decision regarding a regulatory taking. Such a decision is
rendered prior to considering unlawful expropriation.3 57
Alternatively, expropriation may be established in extreme
circumstances where the entire investment value has been
destroyed, even if the regulatory action is in the public's interest.
This is done358so that individuals need not carry the burden for the
community.
It remains to be seen whether future Israeli treaties will
specify an expropriation formula and, if so, what additional factors
tailored to the Israeli context will be integrated into such a
formula. The lack of existing investment arbitration cases
involving Israel-related treaties makes it difficult to have a clear
answer. The jurisprudence in Israeli Law for compensation of
regulatory takings, however, may be indicative of a trend in Israeli
policy decisions. Although Israel's compensation law is heavily
based on statutory law that has not changed much over the years,
it has evolved through a series of Israeli Supreme Court decisions
with an increasingly property-rights-friendly perspective, gaining
the status of quasi-constitutional law.m Israeli policy makers may
therefore desire that the judiciary, including international

355. See generally Paulsson & Douglas, supra note 343, at 145-58 (criticizing the
general test approach).
356. See e.g. Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, 7 ICSID (W. Bank) 43, 123-25 (finding no
indirect expropriation where the Canadian government reduced the investor's allocation
of a fee free quota for the export of softwood lumber to the United States since the
elements of reliance and governmental undertaking were missing).
357. On the ambiguity between a taking and an unlawful expropriation and its
consequences, see Paulsson & Douglas, supra note 343, at 148-50.
358. Id. at 158.
359. See generally Rachelle Alterman, When the Right to Compensation for
"Regulatory Takings" Goes to the Extreme: The Case of Israel,6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD.
L. REv. 121 (2007) (discussing the development and expansion of regulatory takings and
compensation law in Israel).
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tribunals, extensively develop compensation rights for regulatory
takings.
E. Compensation
As discussed earlier,360 the notion that deprived investors
should be. compensated by host states for the loss of their
investments has become an integral part of customary
international law. This also explains the extensive discussion in
academia and international arbitration concerning what should be
considered a compensable expropriation. The Hull formula, which
is the leading formula for compensation in international
investment law in the developed world, calls for "adequate,
effective and prompt" compensation.3 61 The former concept of
compensation, utilized by the developing world in the postdecolonization era in the 1960s and 1970s, offered an "appropriate
compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the state
taking such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in
accordance with international law."3 62 This was influenced by the
natural
principle of permanent sovereignty of states over their
363
resources and did not offer investors full compensation.
While the standard of "adequate, effective, and prompt"
compensation became an international consensus, arbitral
tribunals differ on how to implement this standard in concrete
cases, and more specifically, how to asses a reasonable rate of
return and legitimate expectations of the investor. This is one of
the. most common yet complicated issues in investor-state

360. See supra Part VI.D.
361. LOWENFELD, supra note 351, at 399.
362. Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), at 15,
U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Sept. 14, 1962); accord Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), at 50, 52, U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974);
Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3201 (S-VI), at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3201(S-VI) (May 1, 1974); Programme of Action on
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3203 (S-VI), at 5,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/3203 (S-VI) (May 1, 1974); Development and International Economic
Co-operation, G.A. Res. 3362 (S-VII), U.N. GAOR, 7th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/10301 (Sept. 16, 1975).
363. Norbert Horn, Arbitration and the Protection of Foreign Investment: Concepts and
Means, in ARBITRATING

FOREIGN INVESTMENT

DISPUTES:

PROCEDURAL

SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS 3, 8-9 (Norbert Horn & Stefan Kroll eds., 2004).
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arbitration.3 6 The market-based nature of the Israeli economy will
make it easier for tribunals to evaluate the "fair market value" of
an investment in Israel under consideration. 3 65
In addition to the obligation to expropriate only under the
conditions of the treaty, Israeli treaties also include a nondiscrimination obligation and a mandatory compensation for
requisitioning or destruction of property obligation, in case of
losses resulting from war, armed conflict, or. civil disorder. 66
Section 2 of Article 4 in the New Israeli Model supplements these
obligations and specifically covers "requisitioning of property" by
the host state's forces or authorities, or "destruction of property"
by host states' forces or authorities, "which was not caused in
combat action or was not required by the necessity of the
situation," and accords investors "restitution or adequate
compensation." 367 Israel is clearly vulnerable to internal and
external conflicts, and the proposed language ensures equal and
compensatory treatment to foreign investors in a wide range of
scenarios. It is interesting to note that the old generation Israeli
treaties included in their "compensation for losses" provisions 369a
reference to the payment requirement of a convertible currency,
but deleted it in the New Model as a result of the annulment of the
currency control mechanism in the Israeli economy.170 Other
countries, such as the United States, prefer to include similar nondiscrimination and compensation provisions as part of their BIT's
364. See, e.g. CME Czech Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic,
Final Award, 160 (UNCITRAL Arbitration Proceedings, Mar. 14, 2003), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/CME-2003-Final_001.pdf. (Ian Brownlie, one of the three
arbitrators, gave a separate dissenting opinion reducing the amount of compensation due
to the claimant's dominant position in the Czech TV market). For a related discussion, see
Horn,supra note 363, at 4-6.
365. Other economies, such as the Chinese, have not yet developed a full market value
mechanism. This creates difficulties in calculating the amount of compensation on the
basis of market value. Tearing Down the Great Wall, supra note 246, at 109.
366. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 4.
367. Id. Note that the difference between "adequate compensation" for requisitioning
or destruction of property, and the more complete standard of compensation for losses
resulting from expropriation of "prompt, adequate and effective," did not get much
attention during the review process of the new model.
368. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the vast majority of investment
arbitration cases deal with direct and indirect expropriation, rather than with losses
resulting from military or civil conflicts.
369. Old Model BIT, supra note 59 ("Resulting payments shall be freely transferable
in a freely convertible currency without delay").
370. See New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 4.
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"minimum standard of treatment" provision,371 but Israeli treaties
do. not adopt such inclusive approach to the minimum standard.
To guarantee the investor full compensation, the New Israeli
Model adopts the language of many other investment treaties and
requires that the amount of compensation against unlawful
expropriation ignores any reduction in an investment's value due
to public knowledge of the expropriation, and that it carries
interest at the applicable rate until the date of payment. The
compensation should also be without delay, effectively realized,
and freely transferable.37 2 Although the New Model, like other
investment treaties, states that the "compensation shall amount to
the market value of the investment expropriated,"3 73 the text does
not provide any reference to an investment that is not made in
"freely usable currency," as defined by the IMF in accordance with
of the Agreement of the International Monetary
the Articles
374
Fund. This lacuna, which makes it harder to evaluate an
investment in the least developing economies, should be fixed by
providing a currency exchange mechanism to evaluate such an
investment.375
Finally, the Israeli investment treaty model includes an
exception to the expropriation provision, by which . any
authorization of intellectual property rights pursuant to the 1994
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement
("TRIPS") will not be considered expropriation for the purposes
of the treaty.376 This reservation follows Article 6, Section 5, of the
U.S. 2004 Model BIT, according to which the expropriation
provisions do not apply to authorization of intellectual property
371. U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 8. Since the "minimum standard of
treatment" provision in the U.S. 2004 Model BIT reflects the customary international law
standard according to Annex A of the U.S. 2004 Model BIT, which consequently refers to
all customary international law principles that protect economic rights and interests of
aliens, it naturally includes the non-discrimination principle in treating losses of war or
civil disturbance.
372. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 4.
* 373. Id.
374. Id. at 4 ("The term 'freely usable currency' shall mean a currency that the
International Monetary Fund determines, from time to time, as a freely usable currency in
accordance with the Articles of the Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and
Amendments thereto").
375. For an example of such a mechanism, see The U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note
27, at 8-10. This model also includes payments made pursuant to expropriation and
compensation obligations in the list of permitted transfers.
376. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 5.
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rights in accordance with the TRIPS Agreement.3 7 7 This recent
addition to Israeli investment treaties reflects the new trend of
adjusting existing Israeli treaties to international commitments,
such as the TRIPS Agreement and other WTO Agreements, to
avoid referring to local laws, which prioritize the multiple legal
regimes that may apply to the foreign investment under
consideration. Other than this unique exception, Israeli treaties
follow recent global trends as discussed above and are gradually
extending the safety net of providing full compensation to its
foreign investors.
F Repatriationof Investments and Returns
The ability of foreign investors to transfer their investments
and returns is a crucial factor in their investment decision. In spite
of the378fact that foreign direct investment is defined as a long-term
asset, investors need to be assured that they will be able to
transfer and use or reinvest their returns, while maximizing their
investments through new investment allocations.
The Israeli economy formerly employed a currency control
regime, which included certain limitations on transfer of
investment and returns, to control the local currency and avoid
high inflation.3 79 During the 1990s the Israeli government managed
to stop hyperinflation and reduced its intervention in many aspects
of the Israeli economy in favor of a market economy, and, as a
result, abolished the currency control regime.3so The harsh
consequences and lasting memory of that regime has, to this day,
impacted the architecture of economic agreements and
negotiations of investment treaties with Israel.

377. U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 9.
378. Investment treaties and investment arbitral tribunals are using a broad definition
of 'investment' to include all kinds of investment. However, international investment law
jurisprudence differentiates between long-term and portfolio investment and is reluctant
to protect holders of portfolio investments due to their limited expectations and limited
contribution to the host economy.
379. For example, as part of the limitations on shekel (the Israeli currency) foreign
currency transactions by Israeli nationals, Israeli citizens were not permitted to transfer
foreign currency between foreign currency accounts without first converting the sum into
shekels.
380. The last phase of this elimination process was on Jan. 1, 1998, when the Israeli
government allowed Israeli citizens to exchange shekels to foreign currency without
limitation and to deposit money into foreign currency accounts in local banks in Israel.
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In its investment treaties, Israel guarantees its foreign
investors the rights of unrestricted transfer of their investments
and returns. Such transfers are promised "without delay in the
freely usable currency in which the capital was originally invested
or in any other freely usable currency agreed by the investor and
the Host."382 The model does, however, allow a contracting party
to adopt restrictive measures to deal with "serious balance of
payments difficulties" or "serious difficulties for the operation of
the exchange of rate policy or monetary policy."383 These
restrictive measures must: (a) meet the conditions of the GATT
framework and of Articles VIII and XIV of the Statutes of the
International Monetary Fund; (b) not go beyond the necessary to
remedy the situation; (c) not last for a period exceeding six
months; and (d) be equitable, non-discriminatory, and in good
faith."'
A comparative analysis of permitted restrictive measures in
investment treaties leads to the conclusion that the Israeli model
imposes strong restrictions on transfer control regulations and
limits their circumstances, scope, and time, while other models
allow such restrictions in the context of several local regulatory
fields that require them. The far-reaching right of transfer of
investment funds and returns and the limited exceptions should,
therefore, be explained in the context of the continuous expansion
of the free and competitive foreign exchange market in Israel.
Moreover, foreign investors will be able to apply the MFN clause
in order to benefit from the broader capital transfer provisions
provided by recent Israeli treaties in comparison to old generation
treaties under the foreign exchange control regime.
G. Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Many modern investment treaties include a separate section
that provides a dispute settlement mechanism between the foreign
investor and the host state in addition to the state-state dispute
settlement mechanism. This important innovation of international
investment law enforces the obligations of the contracting parties
and grants a binding legal procedure without a direct privity
381.
382.
383.
384.

New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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between the investor and the host state.m This section will now
discuss key provisions of the investor-state arbitration mechanism
in the Israeli context.
While many developing countries rejected the concept of
binding investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms in the 1980s
and even in the 1990s, Israel has integrated this concept into its
investment treaties since the inception of the BITs program in the
early 1980s. By the time Israel negotiated and signed its first BIT
with a developing country, Zaire, in 1985, Israel had already signed
the ICSID Convention. This was a significant step towards a
legal integration into the global economy.
Article 8 of the New Israeli Model provides for several
dispute resolution alternatives if negotiations between the parties
are not fruitful within six months. The investment treaty serves
as an unconditional consent of the host country to the submission
of a dispute to international arbitration, while the foreign investors
provide their consent by initiation of the arbitration procedure.3 8 8
of
This consent is necessary to apply the Additional Facility Rules
389
ICSID when applicable, and to enforce the arbitration award.
An investor under the New Model can choose from the
(a) a local court of host country; (b)
following options:
conciliation; (c) an ICSID -arbitration, provided that both
contracting parties are parties to the ICSID Convention; (d)
arbitration under the Additional Facility Rules of ICSID in case
only one of the parties is a party to the ICSID Convention; or, (e)
an ad hoc arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of
UNCITRAL.x
The New Model chose not to refer to the International
Chamber of Commerce ("ICC") or the Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce, with which the Israeli legal
385. For a description of the development of this binding legal mechanism in
international investment law, see Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There a Better Way? Alternative
Methods of Treaty-Based Investor-State Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INTL L.J. 138,
140-53.
386. Israel signed the Convention on June 16, 1980, and it entered into force on July
22, 1983. ICSID, List Of Contracting States And Other Signatories Of The Convention,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=
ContractingStates&ReqFrom=Main (as of Jan. 7, 2010).
387. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 8.
388. See Am. Mfg. & Trading Inc. v. Zaire, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 11, 25-26 (1997).
389. See New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 8.
390. Id. at 7-8.
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system is not familiar. 9 ' The New Model, however, extended the
list of options available to foreign investors, which previously
included only a court of competent jurisdiction, ICSID arbitration
or an arbitrator or international ad hoc arbitral tribunal.'9
Practically, the majority of investment arbitration cases are
initiated in ICSID.
The Israeli New Model, unlike many other bilateral and
multilateral models,3 93 does not describe the investor-state
mechanism of dispute settlement in detail and only provides the
investor with the possible alternatives. Nevertheless, some of these
provisions have attracted special attention in arbitration
jurisprudence and have an impact on the scope of investor
protection in Israeli investment treaties. This section will discuss
some of these key provisions.
First, the New and Old Israeli models both include a cooling
period of six months, within which investment claims cannot be
brought during settlement negotiations.3 94 Different models
suggest different cooling periods in order to explore diplomatic
options in good faith, and six months is within the range of existing
practice.' Nevertheless, most arbitral tribunals found that the
cooling period is procedural and not jurisdictional, and thus
investors cannot be denied jurisdiction if they did not provide the
required notification of a dispute prior to commencing arbitration
and did not observe the cooling period.m It should be mentioned,
though, that some other cases, such as Enron Corp. v. Argentina,

391. These institutions are perceived by the Israeli legal system as expensive European
institutions that do not offer the adequate efficiency expected from alternative dispute
resolution forums.
392. Old Model BIT, supra note 59, art. 8, § 2. The new additions, conciliation, and
ICSID Additional Facility arbitration reflect developments in international arbitration
practice in recent decades. The New Model also limits the ad hoc arbitration to
UNCITRAL arbitration due to its popularity and harmonizing effect on international
arbitration.
393. See, e.g. U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27 (adopting many new provisions that
increase the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, and equality of the dispute settlement
mechanism in the treaty).
394. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 8; Old Model BIT, supra note 59, art. 8(2).
395. While the U.K. model provides for 3 months cooling period, both the German
and the U.S. models provide for 6 months cooling period.
396. See e.g., Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi AS v. Pakistan, ICSID (W.
Bank) Case No. ARB/03/29, Decision on Jurisdiction, 1 102 (Nov. 14, 2005).
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have disagreed and concluded that this obligation is
jurisdictional.'9 '
Under the New and Old Israeli models, assuming the cooling
off period has expired, the investor can submit an investment claim
using one of the above-mentioned options. While many arbitral
tribunals have previously questioned the nature of the consent to
398
the procedure provided by the investor and host state, the
American Manufacturing & Trading Co. v. Zaire tribunal clarified
that the state gives its consent in the treaty and399the investor gives
his or her consent in the request for arbitration. Thus, there is no
need to have both consents in the same document in order to
express the "meeting of the minds" for the arbitration process.
In addition to satisfying the jurisdictional requirement of
consent in writing in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention,4m this
mutual consent also satisfies the agreement in writing requirement
of Article II of the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement 401of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York
Convention"). Indeed, the lack of privity between the parties has
triggered extensive literature referring to the investment
procedure of private players
arbitration process as an enforced
402
against states in international law.
The Israeli New Model specifically addresses the consent
requirement and refers to Chapter 2 of the ICSID Convention and
Article II of the New York Convention. Similar to the U.S. 2004
Model BIT,403 Article 8 of the Israeli New Model provides that a
397. Enron Corp. v. Argentina, 11 ICSID (W. Bank) 268, 272 (2007). Although the
tribunal found that the cooling period requirement is jurisdictional, it also concluded that
an original notification would satisfy this requirement with respect to any future expansion
of the claim.
398. See, e.g., Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, 3 ICSID (W. Bank) 45, 145-49 (1988).
399. Am. Mfg. & Trading Inc. v. Zaire, 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 11, 25-26 (1997).
400. ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, supra note 196, at 18.
401. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art.
II(1), June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. Although Article 11(2) defines
agreement in writing as an arbitral clause in a contract or arbitration agreement, arbitral
tribunals have found that the embedded conseni in the investment treaty satisfies the
agreement in writing requirement and is allowed to enforce non-ICSID awards under the
New York Convention. See also OccidentalExploration and Prod., 2 Lloyd's Rep. at 2444.
. 402. See generally Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. FOREIGN
INv. L. J. 232 (1995) (discussing how the BIT created an extension of arbitral jurisdiction
to private complainants who do not have privity to the treaty).
403. U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 25.
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state's consent in an investment treaty and an investor's consent in
an investment claim satisfy the requirements of Article 25 of the
ICSID Convention and Article II of the New York Convention. 04
Although, as discussed above, this assumption is not questionable
anymore in investment arbitration jurisprudence, such clarification
prevents any potential ambiguity in future arbitration cases based
on Israeli investment treaties.
One of the most challenging topics arising out of dispute
resolution provisions is parallel proceedings. The term refers to a
situation where the application of multiple investment treaties and
recourse to national courts encourage investors to use various
405
forums simultaneously with respect to the same subject matter.
an investor's
Therefore, investment models have tried to limit
406
claim to a single forum in several different ways.
One approach is to force an investor to elect a forum when
initiating the first proceeding. Investment treaties that follow this
approach usually include a "fork in the road" provision, which
prevents an investor from applying to international arbitration if
she already brought a claim in a domestic court. Treaty claims,
which are based on investors' protection standards, and contract
claims, which are based on rights and obligations of respective
parties in investment agreements, will be considered as different
legal sources for this purpose. According to investment arbitration
jurisprudence and scholarship, this election will apply only when
the cause of action in the different proceedings is identical.4 0 ' In
most cases, however, investors turn to arbitral tribunals for treaty
claims, such as violation of the fair and equitable standard, while at
the same time use local courts for breach of investment contract
claims, including domestic administrative remedies. Thus, the use
and application of this method in investment jurisprudence is very
limited.
Another approach is for the investor to waive all other claims
by providing a waiver at the time of the initiation of the claim
before an investment tribunal.408 Both NAFTA and the U.S. 2004
404. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 8.
405. See MCLACHLAN, supra note 4, at 80.
406. For more on the forum shopping dilemma in international investment arbitration,
see Parallel State and Arbitral Procedures in International Arbitration, Dossier III from
the ICC Institute of World Business Law, ICC Publication No. 692, 2005 Edition.
407. See MCLACHLAN, supra note 4, at 95-96, 99-100, 104.
408. Id. at 96.
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Model BIT follow this approach. 40 9 Article 26(2) of the U.S.
Model requires the claimant to waive "any right to initiate or
continue before any administrative tribunal or court under the law
of either Party, or other dispute settlement procedures, any
proceeding with respect to any measure alleged to constitute a
breach referred to in Article 24.",410 The waiver does not apply to
interim411injunctive relief or other non-monetary damages in local
courts.
NAFTA tribunals, interpreting similar text, gave a very broad
interpretation to this language to cover all possible legal
procedures and avoid multiple recoveries of damages.4 1 '
Additionally, both NAFTA and the U.S. 2004 Model BIT require
a similar waiver from an investor on behalf of the organization that
is owned or controlled by the investor either directly or
indirectly413 to avoid double recovery through one of the
enterprises owned or controlled by the claimant. This method will
encourage investors to exhaust local remedies first, and if not
satisfied, apply to arbitral tribunals that will be able to review both
the breach of treaty claims and the414initial judicial treatment as part
of the fair and equitable standard.
The Israeli New Model, which does not follow either of the
methods discussed above, provides that an investor can bring a
claim to an international tribunal as long as a national court has
not yet 411delivered a judgment on the "subject matter" of the
This hybrid approach encourages forum shopping
dispute.
before any judgment is given, and does not address the
consequences of multiple judgments given by both local courts and
arbitral tribunals. The open-textured reference to "subject matter"
is also not detailed enough to provide the scope of the claims and
proceedings covered by the provision.
409. NAFTA, supra note 166, art. 1121; U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 26.
410. U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 26.
411. NAFrA, supra note 166, art. 1121; U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 26.
412. See, e.g., Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States, 5 ICSID (W. Bank)
443 (2000). In this case, the NAFTA tribunal extended the application of waiver to
proceedings that are based on the municipal law of Mexico. The tribunal concluded that
the waiver applies to any claims, whatever their legal basis, that were derived from or
concerned the same measures adopted by the host state, which were to be the subject of
the investment arbitration claim. Id. at 444.
413. NAFTA, supra note 166, art. 1121(1); U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 26.
414. MCLACHLAN, supra note 4, at 107.
415. New Model BIT, supra note 76, art. 8.
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To summarize, the extensive BIT network provides foreign
investors with a variety of fora for their investment claims,
including different arbitration regimes in addition to the choice
between a national court and arbitration. Consequently,
multinational corporations can structure their organizations and
transactions to benefit from this BIT network. Establishing a
subsidiary in a third country with which an investor's home state
has a BIT is a popular structure. Many of Israeli BITs have been
signed for a period of ten years and future review of these BITs
may lead to revisions of relevant provisions
based on recent
416
experience with multinationals' structures.
Finally, several recent model BITs include additional dispute
settlement provisions, which aim to address sustainable
development needs and the unbalanced pro-host states
atmosphere of investment treaties, as well as the effectiveness and
transparency of the proceedings. For instance, the U.S. 2004
Model BIT and the IISD Model International Agreement on
Investment for Sustainable Development mentioned above
include the transparency of the documentation of the arbitral
proceeding, the ability to submit amicus curiae by a person or an
entity that is not a disputing party, the ability to refer to expert
reports, the choice to consolidate two or more claims that have a
question of law or fact in common 417
and arise out of the same
events, and possible appellate review. These provisions did not
find their way into the Israeli models, and any future review of
existing Israeli investment treaties should take them into account
as part of the global approach to investment arbitration. In fact,
many of these provisions reflect arbitration jurisprudence, which
Israeli investors are also subject to according to the developing
international investment common law.
VII. CONCLUSION

The developing story of Israeli investment treaties combines
two significant phenomena: a success story of integration into the
global economy and an increased use of international investment
416. See Julian D.M. Lew, ICSID Arbitration: Special Features and Recent
Developments, in ARBITRATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT DISPUTES: PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL ASPECTS 267, 281 (Norbert Horn & Stefan Kr6ll eds., 2004).

417. U.S. 2004 Model BIT, supra note 27, at 27, 29-32, 40; IISD MODEL AGREEMENT,
supra note 8. at 31-34.
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arbitration following the proliferation of investment regulation in
international law. Bilateral investment agreements were
introduced in Israel in the mid 1970s as part of the global postcolonialism new era, but became more popular since the early
1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union, among other
geopolitical changes. This created opportunities for Israeli
investors in several developing countries. The simultaneous
transition of the Israeli economy from import-capital to exportcapital status encouraged the Israeli government to adopt a BIT
program with developing countries in order to protect Israeli
investors in unstable economies. Host states perceived this
program as another tool to increase their foreign investments due
to the positive signal of a more protected and investment-friendly
economic environment.
The first Israeli investment treaties focused geographically on
Eastern Europe, and their structure was influenced by European
models of investment treaties, which had a limited role in
investment liberalization. These treaties traditionally did not apply
their investors' protection provisions to pre-establishment
investments in order to promote market access. Global economic
and political changes in the world economy have brought the
Israeli government to sign and negotiate BITs with developing
countries from various regions. Although some of these recent
treaties were influenced by the language of the emerging North
American BIT models, their structure nevertheless follows
European treaties and lack important concepts which exist in the
North American BIT models. Thus, for example, the new U.S.
2004 Model BIT, which has a significant impact on shaping
modem investment treaties and investor-state arbitration, includes
investment liberalization provisions, applies investors' protection
standards to the pre-establishment phase, secures sustainable
development of host states through human rights provisions, and
introduces new concepts to dispute settlement mechanism, such as
review and amicus brief procedures. Adoption of these important,
potential, innovative elements should be considered as part of any
future review process of the Israeli BITs.
My thorough review of the Israeli BIT program through
interviews, policy documents, and textual analysis did not identify
any coherent program by the Israeli government. BIT negotiations
are frequently driven by ad hoc political or economic needs
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without a careful review of the potential consequences of these
agreements down the road.
An inter-governmental team had reviewed the Israeli Old
Model BIT and introduced the New Model in 2004, which revised
the text of the Old Model to respect international commitments,
better protect security and other national interests, and implement
the negotiation experience of the Israeli government. This team
did not, however, provide any consistent program with respect to
additional candidate states. Since literature shows mixed results
regarding the impact of investment treaties on the volume of
foreign investment, and since the treaty-making process involves
significant resources and needs to create a national economic
policy, this article calls for the centralization of the BIT making
process in Israel. Among the factors to be considered by this
centralized team will be strengthening trade blocs and growing
investment partners, in addition to concluding investment treaties
with developing countries to position Israel as a developed and
capital-exporting economy.
International investment law experienced a plethora of
bilateral investment treaties in recent years, and investor-state
arbitration cases based on these treaties. The large number of
investment arbitration decisions continues to shape modern
investment law jurisprudence, which has an immense impact on
the interpretation of investment treaties, including the ones to
which Israel is a party. As discussed in other studies on this matter,
the current practice of BIT making, the similarity of their content,
and "common law" style legal analysis of investment tribunals
contribute to the "multilateralism" element of investment treaties.
Consequently, Israeli treaties will be subject to interpretation
based on investment jurisprudence. In fact, this article identified
several differences between various BIT models, which reflect
various countries' response to precedents of previous arbitration
decisions. The New Israeli Model and the treaties that were signed
or ratified afterwards, as well as the old agreements that were
signed based on the Old Model, do not reflect many of these
decisions. Since the Israeli treaties are usually in force for ten
years, many of them will be up for renewal in the upcoming years,
which will be an opportunity for the parties to respond to recent
investment jurisprudence. This suggested review process could be
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accompanied by a reassessment of the New Model and the current
BIT program in Israel.
The recent slowdown in BIT negotiation activity and the only
few investment arbitration cases concerning Israeli treaties can be
explained by the role BITs play in the Israeli business, legal, and
governmental communities. As demonstrated by recent studies,
Israeli executives in multinational corporations rarely know if
there are BITs in force with the countries in which they operate,
nor do they realize the importance of their investor-state
arbitration mechanism. Unfortunately, the Israeli government
does not play an active role in changing this reality. Moreover,
international arbitration forums are perceived as expensive and
inefficient, and thus Israeli and foreign investors prefer to apply to
local courts. Finally, while accepting the fact that international
investment tribunals would be the appropriate forum to protect
investors' rights and enhance the welfare of host states, there is a
constant fear on Israel's part of the harsh consequences -of
sovereignty's derogation. This comes as a result of the
development of the Israeli legal system and the essence of
traditional skepticism concerning international legislation and
tribunals, along with the political push for state sovereignty.
The Israeli government is consistently trying to avoid the
utilization of multinational bodies and the globalization of its
political and commercial disputes. This reluctant approach is also
supported by the New Israeli Model, which prefers judicial
certainty upon a comprehensive analysis by arbitrators in future
investor-state cases in various provisions of the model. Moving
forward, an increased number of investment arbitration decisions
may bring parties to Israeli treaties to use those provisions for
investor protection. For instance, international transactions are
already being structured to include corporate vehicles in the
jurisdiction of the relevant treaties.
After years of growing privatization and liberalization of
foreign investment, many countries had become aware of the
negative consequences of the process, which has led to the
nationalization of several key industries and the indirect
expropriation of foreign investments in countries that were
traditionally perceived as friendly to foreign investors. This dejavu feeling of "protectionism" can bring BITs back to the center of
investment law in Israel, along with the ongoing academic
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discussion revolving around their economic effectiveness. Clearly,
in times of economic uncertainty and the slowing of global
markets, aggressive competition for foreign capital can bring these
tools to the center of discussion.
Finally, Israel serves as an important case study for
investment treaty practice as a country in transition from a
developing to developed economy. Both the Israeli BIT program
and the language of draft models reveal the way Israel chooses to
balance its integration into the global economy with protecting its
sovereignty. It remains to be seen whether and how the use of
Israeli BITs by the private sector, as interpreted by investment
tribunals, will influence this balance. Although BITs had a limited
impact so far on other branches of the Israeli administration, its
potential influence on foreign investment policy and full
participation in the global economy, including its emerging legal
institutions, is major.

